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Vehicle service providers can display commercial ads in their vehicles based on passengers’ origins and
destinations to create a new revenue stream. In this work, we study a vehicle service provider who can
generate different ad revenues when displaying ads on different arcs (i.e., origin-destination pairs). The
provider needs to ensure the vehicle flow balance at each location, which makes it challenging to analyze the
provider’s vehicle assignment and pricing decisions for different arcs. For example, the provider’s price for its
service on an arc depends on the ad revenues on other arcs as well as on the arc in question. To tackle the
problem, we show that the traffic network corresponds to an electrical network. When the effective resistance
between two locations is small, there are many paths between the two locations and the provider can easily
route vehicles between them. We characterize the dependence of an arc’s optimal price on any other arc’s
ad revenue using the effective resistances between these two arcs’ origins and destinations. Furthermore,
we study the provider’s optimal selection of advertisers when it can only display ads for a limited number
of advertisers. If each advertiser has one target arc for advertising, the provider should display ads for the
advertiser whose target arc has a small effective resistance. We investigate the performance of our advertiser
selection strategy based on a real-world dataset.
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Display advertising; • Social and professional topics→ Pricing and resource allocation.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In-vehicle advertising has been emerging as a promising approach for vehicle service providers
(e.g., taxi companies and ride-sharing platforms) to monetize their service. Vehicle service providers
can display ads to users of their service, and receive payment from the corresponding advertisers.
Recently, there have been many companies (e.g., VUGO [28], VIEWDIFY [26], and SURF [25]) that
offer technical support for the in-vehicle advertising. By installing these companies’ tablets in the
vehicles, the vehicle service providers can provide various entertainment options (e.g., watching
TV shows and playing games) to users and improve their in-vehicle experience. Meanwhile, the
providers can deliver ads (including banner ads and in-stream ads) via the tablets.
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The in-vehicle advertising enables advertisers to target users based on their travels’ origins and
destinations. For example, many destinations of vehicle service users are in shopping areas [28], and
the advertisers can advertise relevant promotional activities to these users. Likewise, the advertisers
can direct the users whose destinations are in residential areas to online orders for food delivery
[21]. VUGO analyzed around 30,000 rides and showed the diversity of users’ destinations [27]. The
company designs algorithms for vehicle service providers to achieve the targeted advertising.
With the advent of autonomous vehicles, in-vehicle advertising is likely to become increasingly
common and powerful [19, 21]. The autonomous-driving technology will turn drivers into passen-
gers, and vehicles will become “moving living rooms” [19]. Passengers can interact with various
in-vehicle devices (e.g., touchscreens and holographic projectors), which are effective channels for
advertising.
1.1 Our Work
In this work, we study the economic impact of in-vehicle advertising on a vehicle service provider
who displays banner ads or in-stream ads to its users regularly (e.g., every 10 minutes). We use
“an arc” to represent an origin-destination pair, and a “unit ad revenue” to represent the revenue
that the provider can gain by displaying ads to a user for a time slot (e.g., the length of a time slot
can be 10 minutes).1 The advertisers have different target arcs to display their ads, and also have
different willingnesses to pay. Hence, the provider’s unit ad revenues on different arcs are different.
The provider can set different prices for the vehicle service on different arcs [5, 20, 29]. The key
questions that we aim to answer are as follows:
Q1: Given the unit ad revenues, what are the provider’s optimal service prices for different arcs?
Q2: How do the provider’s payoff and consumer surplus change with the unit ad revenues?2
Q3: If the provider can only collaborate with a limited number of advertisers (who have different
target arcs to display ads), which advertisers should the provider collaborate with?
Answering these questions can help us understand the economic impact of in-vehicle advertising
and provide insights for optimizing the provider’s strategies in the presence of in-vehicle advertising.
However, it is challenging to answer these questions, since the provider’s vehicle assignment and
pricing decisions for different arcs (i.e., origin-destination pairs) are tightly coupled by the vehicle
flow balance constraints. In the system’s steady state, the mass of vehicles that depart from a location
should equal the mass of vehicles that arrive at the location. Because of the flow balance constraints,
the provider’s vehicle assignment and pricing for one arc are affected by the network topology
and the other arcs’ parameters (e.g., traffic demand, travel time, and unit ad revenues). The flow
balance constraints do not exist in other advertising models (e.g., web advertising [12] and mobile
advertising [31]), and constitute a unique challenge to the study of in-vehicle advertising.
It is difficult to directly derive the provider’s optimal decisions and payoff as the closed-form
expressions of system parameters. Our key idea is to show that the traffic network, which is
determined by the network topology and the traffic demand and travel time on different arcs, has
1We use an example to estimate the value of the unit ad revenue. According to [1], the average cost per click (CPC) of
Youtube ads was around $3.58 in the second quarter of 2018. Based on [14] and [24], the click-through rate (CTR) of an
in-stream video ad was around 1.84% (note that this number was achieved without location-based targeting and the actual
CTR of an in-vehicle video ad may be higher). When a provider displays 3 in-stream video ads to a user during each time
slot (10 minutes), the unit ad revenue is $0.20 (= 3 × 1.84% × $3.58). This value is comparable to a vehicle service provider’s
net profit when it does not display ads. According to [17], Uber’s net profit is around $8.23 per hour per vehicle, which
corresponds to $1.37 per time slot per vehicle.
2When a user takes the vehicle service, the corresponding consumer surplus is the difference between the highest price that
the user is willing to pay for the service and the price that it actually pays.
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an associated electrical network.3 Each location corresponds to a node in the electrical network.
If there is a positive traffic demand between two locations, there is a resistor between the two
corresponding nodes, and its resistance is determined by the traffic demand and travel time between
the two locations. Given the associated electrical network, we can compute the effective resistance
between any two nodes. Intuitively, a small effective resistance implies that there are many paths
between the two locations and the provider can easily route vehicles between them. Based on the
effective resistances, we can derive closed-form expressions for the provider’s optimal decisions
and payoff, and further answer the three key questions.
We summarize our answers to the three questions as follows.
1. Provider’s Optimal Spatial Pricing (Theorems 3.3 and 4.1). Given the unit ad revenues,
the provider’s optimal price for an arc (i, j) consists of two components. The first component is only
related to the arc’s unit ad revenue. When the unit ad revenue increases, this component decreases,
which means that the provider should lower its price and motivate more users to travel on the
arc and watch ads. The second component is affected by the effective resistances. Specifically, if a
location’s outgoing arcs have large unit ad revenues, it is “valuable” to have available vehicles at
this location. The second component increases with the effective resistances between j (i.e., the
destination of arc (i, j)) and those “valuable” locations. This means that when sending vehicles
from i to j makes it harder to route more vehicles to the “valuable” locations, the provider should
increase its price on arc (i, j) to reduce the traffic from i to j. Furthermore, when the arc’s travel
time is long, the second component has a small impact on the optimal price.
2. Provider’s Payoff and Consumer Surplus (Theorem 5.3). Given the unit ad revenues, we
derive the provider’s payoff and consumer surplus under the provider’s optimal vehicle assignment
and pricing decisions.4 First, we prove that the provider’s total payoff is twice the total consumer
surplus, although this proportional relation in general may not hold for the provider’s payoff
and consumer surplus on an arc. Second, both the provider’s total payoff and the total consumer
surplus are non-decreasing in an arc’s unit ad revenue. If the provider receives sponsorship from
an advertiser and displays its ads to the users on an arc, the provider will change its prices in the
network based on the arc’s unit ad revenue. Although the provider may increase some arcs’ prices,
which reduces the corresponding arcs’ consumer surplus, we show that the total consumer surplus
will not decrease in this case.
3. Provider’s Collaboration with Advertisers (Theorems 6.2 and 6.4).When the provider
starts implementing the in-vehicle advertising, it may only be able to collaborate with a limited
number of advertisers, who have different target arcs to display ads. Different collaboration choices
lead to different unit ad revenues, and we study the provider’s collaboration choice that maximizes
its payoff. First, we consider the situation where the provider can only select one arc-based advertiser,
who is only willing to advertise on one arc, to collaborate with. We show that the provider should
collaborate with the advertiser whose target arc has a large traffic demand, a long travel time, and
a small effective resistance. Intuitively, when an arc (i, j) has a small effective resistance, there are
many paths between i and j . In this case, the provider can route a large mass of vehicles from other
arcs to this arc, which enables the provider to increase the vehicle supply on this arc and let more
users watch ads. Second, we study the provider’s collaboration with location-based advertisers, who
are only willing to advertise on the incoming arcs of their target locations. When (i) a location’s
3The idea is inspired by our observation that the optimal dual variables associated with the flow balance constraints are the
solutions to a system of linear equations, whose coefficient matrix is a Laplacian matrix and has a strong connection with
an electrical network.
4When analyzing the consumer surplus, we do not consider the disutility caused by watching ads. As shown in VUGO’s
example [28], when displaying ads on tablets, a provider also offers entertainment options (e.g., watching TV shows) to
users, which can compensate for the disutility of watching ads.
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incoming arcs have small effective resistances and (ii) the effective resistances between these
incoming arcs’ origins are large, the provider can simultaneously route a large mass of vehicles to
these incoming arcs. Hence, the provider should collaborate with the corresponding location-based
advertiser.
In this work, we assume that the parameters (e.g., traffic demand and unit ad revenues) are
constant, and study the system’s steady state (similar assumptions were made in [5, 16]). In practice,
the parameters may change significantly across different time periods (e.g., peak hours and non-peak
hours). The provider can implement different spatial pricing strategies during these periods. When
selecting the advertisers to collaborate with, the provider should make the decision to maximize its
average payoff over all periods.
1.2 Related Work
Our work is related to the following three streams of literature.
1.2.1 Advertising in Vehicle Networks. There have been many papers studying advertising in
vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs), e.g., [18, 22, 32, 33]. Vehicles and roadside infrastructure can
propagate digital ads in VANETs via vehicle-to-vehicle communications and roadside-to-vehicle
communications, respectively. Qin et al. in [22] analyzed the selection of seed vehicles, which
forward ads to their neighboring vehicles, to maximize the advertising coverage. Lee et al. in [18]
proposed an ad dissemination scheme, which incentivizes selfish vehicles to forward commercial
ads and prevents malicious vehicles from sending out dummy ads. Zeng and Wu in [33] considered
a shopkeeper who uses roadside access points to disseminate the shop’s ads to the passing vehicles,
and analyzed the optimal roadside access point placement. In our work, we consider a different
advertising scenario, where a vehicle service provider displays ads in its vehicles via tablets (the
ads can be preloaded or sent to the tablets via cellular network). The provider increases the mass of
users watching ads through reducing its service prices rather than disseminating the ads to other
vehicles.
1.2.2 Spatial Pricing for Vehicle Service. There is a large literature on vehicle service pricing,
e.g., [2, 3, 5, 11, 20]. Banerjee et al. in [2] modeled a shared vehicle system by a closed-queueing
network, and developed an approximation framework for designing pricing schemes. Ma et al.
in [20] proposed a spatial-temporal pricing mechanism to maximize social welfare. Bimpikis et
al. in [5] considered a ride-sharing platform, and studied the spatial pricing for riders and spatial
compensation for drivers. The authors investigated a model with time-invariant traffic demand,
which is similar to our work. Different from these studies, we focus on analyzing the impact of ad
revenues on a provider’s spatial pricing, and introduce a novel resistance-based analysis approach.
1.2.3 Analysis of Ad-Sponsored Business Models. Some references studied other service providers
who display ads to their users and receive payment from advertisers. In [30], a public Wi-Fi network
provider delivers ads to its Wi-Fi users to monetize the Wi-Fi service. In [13], an app developer
allows users to get virtual items in the app by watching ads. These service providers do not need to
consider flow balance constraints, which constitute a key challenge to our study.
2 MODEL
2.1 Users’ Demand
We consider a discrete-time model, and denote the set of locations by N ≜ {1, 2, . . . ,N }. In each
time slot, a continuum of users of mass θi j ≥ 0 consider taking the provider’s vehicle service to
depart from location i to location j (i, j ∈ N ). In particular, we have θii = 0 for all i ∈ N . Note that{
θi j
}
i, j ∈N induces a directed graph Gd = (N ,A), where there is an arc from i to j (i.e., (i, j) ∈ A) if
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and only if θi j > 0.5 We focus on the case where Gd is weakly connected. When Gd is disconnected,
the provider can solve the problem for each weakly connected component separately.
We use
{
ξi j
}
i, j ∈N to denote the travel time between different locations. If a user takes the vehicle
service, the number of time slots required for the travel from location i to j is ξi j > 0 (j , i). In
Fig. 1(a), we illustrate one example of Gd, and also indicate the users’ demand (i.e.,
{
θi j
}
i, j ∈N) and
travel time (i.e.,
{
ξi j
}
i, j ∈N).
We use a reservation price to refer to the highest price that a user is willing to pay. If the vehicle
service’s price is no greater than the reservation price, the user is willing to take the provider’s
vehicle service; otherwise, the user will travel to its destination by other approaches (e.g., taking
public buses). We first assume that the reservation prices of all the θi j users on arc (i, j) ∈ A
are uniformly distributed in [0, 1]. In Section 7, we will relax this assumption,6 and consider
exponentially distributed reservation prices. Therefore, if the vehicle service’s price is p, the mass
of users that want to take the service from i to j is θi j max {1 − p, 0}. We call θi j max {1 − p, 0} the
actual demand on arc (i, j).
2.2 Provider’s Decisions, Ad Revenue, and Cost
The provider’s decisions include the vehicle assignment and pricing. We use qi j to denote the mass
of vehicles that depart from i to j in each time slot. We use pi j to denote the vehicle service’s price
for arc (i, j), measured in dollars per time slot. If a user travels from i to j via the vehicle service,
since the travel time is ξi j , the user’s total payment is ξi jpi j .
Besides the users’ payment, the provider gets revenue by displaying ads to the users. In each
time slot, the provider displays a fixed number of ads to each user in the provider’s vehicles. To
achieve targeted advertising, the ads are displayed based on the users’ origins and destinations.
Different origin-destination pairs can correspond to different values of ad revenue. Let ai j ≥ 0
denote the provider’s unit ad revenue (i.e., the ad revenue per user per time slot) on arc (i, j). If a
user travels from i to j via the vehicle service, the provider can get ξi jai j by displaying ads to the
user for ξi j time slots.
Next, we model the provider’s cost to provide the vehicle service. When the provider is a taxi
company, the cost can include the company’s payment to the drivers. When the provider is an
autonomous vehicle service provider, the cost can be the vehicles’ energy cost. We use c to denote
the provider’s unit cost, and the provider’s total cost for transporting a user from i to j is ξi jc . In
this work, we focus on the case where c < 1, i.e., the unit cost is smaller than the users’ maximum
reservation price. Furthermore, we consider a homogeneous unit cost c for different arcs. With
more cumbersome notations, we can easily extend our results to the heterogeneous unit cost case.
2.3 Provider’s Problem
The provider decides the vehicle assignment and pricing to maximize its time-average payoff in
the system’s steady state. We first assume that the provider’s supply of vehicles on each arc is
no greater than the actual demand, i.e., qi j ≤ θi j max
{
1 − pi j , 0
}
for all (i, j) ∈ A. This implies
that each vehicle sent on arc (i, j) carries a user. In Section 7, we will relax this assumption and
5In this work, we use “an arc” to refer to a directed edge in Gd, and will use “an edge” to refer to an undirected edge in an
undirected graph (which will be defined later).
6Reference [5] assumed that riders’ reservation prices follow a uniform distribution. Many other references also considered
the consumers with uniformly distributed reservation prices [4, 15].
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consider the provider’s strategy of routing empty vehicles in the network. Then, we can formulate
the provider’s problem as follows:
max
∑
(i, j)∈A
qi jξi j
(
pi j + ai j − c
)
(1a)
s.t. qi j ≤ θi j max
{
1 − pi j , 0
}
,∀ (i, j) ∈ A, (1b)∑
j :(i, j)∈A
qi j =
∑
j :(j,i)∈A
qji ,∀i ∈ N , (1c)
var. qi j ≥ 0,pi j ,∀ (i, j) ∈ A. (1d)
The objective function in (1a) captures the provider’s time-average payoff. In each time slot, a
continuum of vehicles of mass qi j depart from i to j, i.e., qi j is the vehicle departure rate for the
travel from i to j. In any time slot, the mass of vehicles traveling on arc (i, j) is qi jξi j . Each vehicle
carries a user, and the provider gets pi j + ai j − c by serving the user in this time slot. Therefore, the
provider’s time-average payoff from arc (i, j) in the system’s steady state is qi jξi j
(
pi j + ai j − c
)
.
Constraint (1b) states that the supply of vehicles is no greater than the actual demand (which is
the assumption made above). We will show that the optimal supply equals the actual demand, and
hence there is no excess demand. Constraint (1c) captures the vehicle flow balance at each location
i . For arc (i, j), both the rate that the vehicles depart i and the rate that the vehicles arrive at j are
qi j . Considering all arcs, the vehicles’ departure rate at i is
∑
j :(i, j)∈A qi j , and the arrival rate at i is∑
j :(j,i)∈A qji . The two rates are equal under constraint (1c). Note that the travel time ξi j does not
affect the departure rate and arrival rate, so it does not appear in the flow balance constraint.
As indicated in (1d), the provider can set negative prices. Intuitively, when the unit ad revenue is
large, the provider can pay the users to motivate them to take the vehicle service. For arc (i, j), θi j
can be understood as the mass of users who are willing to take the vehicle service when pi j = 0.
If pi j < 0, some users who originally plan to travel by other approaches will take the provider’s
service, and the actual demand θi j
(
1 − pi j
)
will be greater than θi j . Under reasonable parameter
settings (e.g., the settings in our numerical experiments in Section 7.2), the average unit ad revenue
in the network is smaller than the unit cost, and the optimal prices are usually non-negative.
In problem (1), we assume that the provider has sufficient vehicles to meet the actual demand.
We will relax this assumption in Section 7. Next, we transform problem (1) to a pricing problem.
First, we can see that we only need to focus on pi j ≤ 1 for all (i, j) ∈ A. This is because any pi j > 1
reduces the actual demand on arc (i, j) to zero, which is the same as pi j = 1. Second, we only
need to focus on the solutions satisfying qi j = θi j
(
1 − pi j
)
for all (i, j) ∈ A. This is because when
qi j < θi j
(
1 − pi j
)
, the provider can improve its payoff by increasing pi j . Therefore, the provider
can decide its prices by solving the following problem:
max
∑
(i, j)∈A
θi jξi j
(
1 − pi j
) (
pi j + ai j − c
)
(2a)
s.t.
∑
j :(i, j)∈A
θi j
(
1 − pi j
)
=
∑
j :(j,i)∈A
θ ji
(
1 − pji
)
,∀i ∈ N , (2b)
var. pi j ≤ 1,∀ (i, j) ∈ A. (2c)
In Section 3, we will analyze the above problem’s optimal solution. After getting the optimal price
p∗i j for (i, j) ∈ A, we can compute the optimal vehicle assignment for arc (i, j) by q∗i j = θi j
(
1 − p∗i j
)
.
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3 OPTIMAL SPATIAL PRICING
In this section, we analyze the provider’s optimal prices. We will show that the directed graph
Gd corresponds to an electrical network, and the provider’s optimal prices heavily depend on the
resistances in the electrical network.
Let λi be the dual variable corresponding to the flow balance constraint (2b) at location i , and
µi j be the dual variable corresponding to pi j ≤ 1. Since the objective function is quadratic and
concave, and the constraints are affine, problem (2) is convex and the KKT conditions are necessary
and sufficient for optimality. We use p∗i j to denote the optimal price and λ∗i and µ∗i j to denote the
optimal dual variables. We can derive the following proposition (we leave all the proofs in our
appendix).
Proposition 3.1. The provider’s optimal price for arc (i, j) ∈ A is given by
p∗i j =
1 − ai j + c
2 +
λ∗i − λ∗j
2ξi j
−
µ∗i j
2ξi jθi j
. (3)
In (3), λ∗i and λ∗j correspond to the flow balance constraints at i and j, respectively. The value of
λ∗i − λ∗j depends on the parameters (e.g., unit ad revenues) of the other arcs as well as those of arc
(i, j). In Sections 3.1 and 3.2, we explicitly characterize this dependency by introducing an electrical
network. The results will enable us to further characterize the dependence of p∗i j on the network
parameters.
In (3), µ∗i j corresponds to the constraint pi j ≤ 1, and hence we have µ∗i j ≥ 0. For ease of exposition,
we first analyze the case where µ∗i j = 0 for all (i, j) ∈ A in Section 3.1. Then, we extend the results
to the general case (where µ∗i j ≥ 0) in Section 3.2.
3.1 µ∗i j = 0 Case
In this subsection, we analyze λ∗i − λ∗j in (3) in the case where µ∗i j = 0 for all (i, j) ∈ A. We first
compute λ∗i − λ∗j using the flow balance constraint, and then interpret the result based on an
electrical network.
3.1.1 Value of λ∗i − λ∗j . We substitute the expression of p∗i j in (3) into the flow balance constraint
(2b), and get the following equation for each i ∈ N :∑
j :(i, j)∈A
θi j
(
1 + ai j − c
2 −
λ∗i − λ∗j
2ξi j
)
=
∑
j :(j,i)∈A
θ ji
(
1 + aji − c
2 −
λ∗j − λ∗i
2ξ ji
)
. (4)
We can get λ∗i (i ∈ N ) by solving the system of equations given by (4). Next, we introduce several
definitions, and rearrange the system of equations. First, we define an N × N matrix L, whose ij-th
entry is given by
li j ≜

∑
m,i,m∈N
(
θim
ξim
+
θmi
ξmi
)
, if i = j,
− θi jξi j −
θ ji
ξ ji
, if i , j .
(5)
Matrix L is the Laplacian matrix of a weighted undirected graph Gu = (N , E), which corresponds
to the directed graph Gd. Specifically, E contains edge (i, j) if and only if there exists at least one arc
between i and j in the directed graph Gd. Moreover, edge (i, j) is associated with a weight, which is
θi j
ξi j
+
θ ji
ξ ji
. We illustrate an example of Gu in Fig. 1(b). Since Gd is weakly connected, Gu is connected.
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(c) Electrical Network.
Fig. 1. Examples of Gd, Gu, and Electrical Network (When µ∗i j = 0 for All (i, j) ∈ A).
Second, we define an N × 1 vectorv , whose i-th entry is given by
vi ≜
∑
m:(i,m)∈A
θim (1 + aim − c) −
∑
m:(m,i)∈A
θmi (1 + ami − c) . (6)
Here, vi measures the value of having available vehicles at location i . When vi is large, the traffic
demand and unit ad revenues on the arcs originating from i are large (compared with those on the
arcs pointing to i). In this situation, the provider needs to route more vehicles to i to achieve a high
payoff. Note that vi can be negative, and we always have
∑
i ∈N vi = 0.
Let λ∗ ≜
(
λ∗1, λ
∗
2, . . . , λ
∗
N
)⊺. Using the fact that θi j = 0 for all (i, j) < A, we can rearrange the
system of equations given by (4) as
Lλ∗ = v . (7)
Note that L is the Laplacian matrix of a connected undirected graph Gu. Hence, the rank of L is
N − 1, and L is non-invertible [23]. As a substitute for the inverse, we consider the generalized
inverse of L [10], and denote it by L+. In the following proposition, we characterize the solution
space of (7) based on L+.
Proposition 3.2. The solution space of (7) is{
λ : λ = L+v + β (1, 1, . . . , 1)⊺ , β ∈ R} . (8)
Moreover, we have
λ∗i − λ∗j =
∑
k ∈N
(
l+ik − l+jk
)
vk ,∀i, j ∈ N . (9)
There are infinitely many λ∗ satisfying (7), but (9) shows that λ∗i − λ∗j is uniquely determined by
l+ik , l
+
jk , and vk , k ∈ N . Next, we interpret l+ik and l+jk by introducing an electrical network.
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3.1.2 Electrical Network. Given graph Gu = (N , E), we can get an electrical network via replacing
the vertices in N by nodes and the edges in E by resistors. If (i, j) ∈ E, we use ri j to denote the
resistance of the resistor between nodes i and j, and let ri j = 1θi j
ξi j
+
θji
ξji
(which is the inverse of the
weight of edge (i, j) in Gu). In Fig. 1(c), we illustrate an example of the electrical network.
In the electrical network, the effective resistance between any two nodes i and j (i, j ∈ N ) is
defined as the voltage between i and j when a unit current is injected at i and withdrawn at j. Let
Ri j denote the effective resistance between i and j. We can see that Rii = 0 and Ri j = R ji for all
i, j ∈ N . For example, in Fig. 1(c), R12 can be computed as R12 = r12(r13+r32)r12+r13+r32 .
According to [23], the effective resistances in the electrical network have the following relation
with L+ of graph Gu:
Ri j = l
+
ii + l
+
j j − 2l+i j ,∀i, j ∈ N . (10)
Using this relation, the property that
∑
k ∈N vk = 0, and Proposition 3.2, we can prove the following
theorem, which characterizes λ∗i − λ∗j and p∗i j based on the effective resistances.
Theorem 3.3. In the case where µ∗i j = 0 for all (i, j) ∈ A, the value of λ∗i − λ∗j is given by
λ∗i − λ∗j =
1
2
∑
k ∈N
(
R jk − Rik
)
vk ,∀i, j ∈ N , (11)
where vk is defined in (6). From (3), we can compute p∗i j by
p∗i j =
1 − ai j + c
2 +
1
4ξi j
∑
k ∈N
(
R jk − Rik
)
vk ,∀ (i, j) ∈ A. (12)
Remark 1: Theorem 3.3 enables us to understand the dependence of p∗i j on the network topology
and parameters:
• First, the term 1−ai j+c2 is only related to arc (i, j). When ai j increases, this term decreases,
which means that the provider should lower its price and motivate more users to travel on
arc (i, j) to get the ad revenue.
• Second, ∑k ∈N (R jk − Rik ) vk is affected by the effective resistances and vector v . The ef-
fective resistance between two nodes measures their “distance” in the electrical network
(a large effective resistance implies a large distance). Moreover, vk measures the value of
having vehicles at k (as defined in (6)). Suppose that, compared with location i , location j is
“farther” from most of the locations with large vk in the electrical network. In this situation,∑
k ∈N
(
R jk − Rik
)
vk is large. Eq. (12) implies that the provider should charge a high price
p∗i j to reduce the actual demand on arc (i, j). This reduces the mass of vehicles traveling from
i to j, which is farther from most “valuable” locations.
• Third, when ξi j is large, ∑k ∈N (R jk − Rik ) vk has a small impact on p∗i j . Therefore, when an
arc has a long travel time, the network topology and the other arcs’ parameters have a small
impact on the arc’s optimal price.
An interesting observation is that the direction of user demand affects p∗i j via vector v rather
than the effective resistances. Specifically, the resistance of the resistor between two locations x and
y is computed by rxy = 1θxy
ξxy
+
θyx
ξyx
. Suppose that ξxy = ξyx and θxy , θyx . If we swap the values of
θxy and θyx , the value of rxy will not change, which implies that the effective resistances between
different locations will not change. However, the swapping of θxy and θyx will change vx and vy ,
and further affect p∗i j .
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3.2 General Case
In this subsection, we discuss the extension of our results in Section 3.1 to the general case, where
µ∗i j ≥ 0 for all (i, j) ∈ A. We will characterize λ∗i −λ∗j and p∗i j based on a modified electrical network.
We can compute µ∗i j ((i, j) ∈ A) based on the KKT conditions. If µ∗i j = 0, we can simplify (3) as
p∗i j =
1−ai j+c
2 +
λ∗i−λ∗j
2ξi j ; otherwise, we have p
∗
i j = 1 based on the complementary slackness condition.
By substituting the expression of p∗i j into the flow balance constraint (2b), we get the following
equations:∑
j :(i, j)∈A
θi j1{µ∗i j=0}
(
1 + ai j − c
2 −
λ∗i − λ∗j
2ξi j
)
=
∑
j :(j,i)∈A
θ ji1{µ∗ji=0}
(
1 + aji − c
2 −
λ∗j − λ∗i
2ξ ji
)
,∀i ∈ N .
(13)
Compared with (4) in Section 3.1, Eq. (13) includes an extra indicator function 1{·} , which equals 1
if the event in braces is true and equals 0 otherwise.
Let θˆi j ≜ θi j1{µ∗i j=0} for all i, j ∈ N . After replacing {θi j }i, j ∈N by {θˆi j }i, j ∈N , we can conduct
a similar analysis as in Section 3.1. Specifically, we define vˆ and a new electrical network based
on
{
θˆi j
}
i, j ∈N
, and compute the corresponding effective resistance Rˆi j for all i, j ∈ N . Note that
when θˆi j = θˆ ji = 0, nodes i and j are not directly connected by a resistor in the new electrical
network. Similar to (11) in Theorem 3.3, the value of λ∗i − λ∗j is 12
∑
k ∈N
(
Rˆ jk − Rˆik
)
vˆk . Therefore,
in the general case, the optimal price p∗i j ((i, j) ∈ A) satisfies the following equation:
p∗i j =
{ 1−ai j+c
2 +
1
4ξi j
∑
k ∈N
(
Rˆ jk − Rˆik
)
vˆk , if µ∗i j = 0,
1, if µ∗i j > 0.
(14)
Eq. (14) reduces to (12) in Theorem 3.3 when µ∗i j = 0 for all (i, j) ∈ A. Based on (14), we can see the
connection between the optimal prices and an electrical network, and derive similar insights as in
Remark 1.
3.3 Discussion of µ∗i j = 0 Case and General Case
According to our analysis in Sections 3.1 and 3.2, the provider’s optimal prices can always be
characterized by the effective resistances in an electrical network. When µ∗i j = 0 for all (i, j) ∈ A,
the electrical network is defined based on
{
θi j
}
i, j ∈N ; otherwise, it is defined based on
{
θˆi j
}
i, j ∈N
. In
Sections 4-6, we will first derive the results for the µ∗i j = 0 case, which simplifies the presentation,
and then extend the results to the general case.
To understand the characteristics of the network parameters that lead to µ∗i j = 0, we introduce
Proposition 3.4. It shows a sufficient condition under which we have µ∗i j = 0 for all (i, j) ∈ A.
Proposition 3.4. When the system parameters satisfy∑
k ∈N
|vk | ≤ min(x,y)∈A 2
(
θxy + θyx
ξxy
ξyx
) (
1 + axy − c
)
, (15)
we have µ∗i j = 0 for all (i, j) ∈ A.
Intuitively, (15) means that the arcs originating from and pointing to each location have similar
traffic demand and unit ad revenues. Specifically, vk is defined in (6), and equals the difference be-
tween
∑
m:(k,m)∈A θkm (1 + akm − c) and
∑
m:(m,k )∈A θmk (1 + amk − c). The first term corresponds
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to the arcs originating from k , and the second term corresponds to the arcs pointing to k . Hence,∑
k ∈N |vk | captures the sum of the absolute differences between these two terms over all locations.
The right side of (15) is a bound determined by the network parameters.
For example, if θi j = θ ji and ai j = aji for all (i, j) ∈ A, we can verify that vk = 0 for all k ∈ N ,
and inequality (15) always holds (recall that c < 1). Moreover, if Gd corresponds to a unidirectional
ring network and the arcs have the same traffic demand and unit ad revenue, we also have vk = 0
for all k ∈ N , and (15) is satisfied.
4 INFLUENCE BETWEEN ARCS
In this section, we study the impact of an arc’s unit ad revenue on the provider’s optimal prices for
different arcs. We first focus on the µ∗i j = 0 case (e.g., when the system parameters satisfy (15) in
Proposition 3.4), and introduce the following theorem.
Theorem 4.1. For any (x ,y) ∈ A, its unit ad revenue’s impact on the optimal price for arc (i, j) ∈ A
is given by
∂p∗i j
∂axy
= −121{i=x, j=y } +
θxy
4ξi j
(
R jx − Rix − R jy + Riy
)
. (16)
In particular, we have
∂p∗xy
∂axy
≤ 0.
Remark 2: Theorem 4.1 characterizes the impact of axy on p∗i j :
• First, p∗xy is non-increasing in axy , i.e.,
∂p∗xy
∂axy
≤ 0. When axy increases, the provider should
reduce pxy , which motivates more users to travel on arc (x ,y) and generates more ad revenue.
• Second, if (i, j) , (x ,y), the sign of ∂p
∗
i j
∂axy
is determined by the sign of R jx − Rix −
(
R jy − Riy
)
.
Specifically, when axy increases, the provider needs more vehicles to travel on arc (x ,y) to
serve more users on this arc. The flow balance constraints for locations x and y require the
provider to route more vehicles to x and less vehicles to y, respectively. Next, we show that
if R jx − Rix −
(
R jy − Riy
)
< 0, decreasing pi j can route more vehicles to be closer to x or
farther from y.7 If R jx −Rix −
(
R jy − Riy
)
< 0, at least one of R jx −Rix < 0 and R jy −Riy > 0
holds. Recall that the effective resistance between two locations measures their distance
in the electrical network. The inequality R jx − Rix < 0 means that location x is closer to j
than to i , and R jy − Riy > 0 means that location y is farther from j than from i . Therefore, if
R jx − Rix −
(
R jy − Riy
)
< 0, a vehicle can be closer to x or farther from y by traveling from
i to j. When the provider decreases pi j , the actual demand on arc (i, j) increases and more
vehicles travel from i to j. In this case, more vehicles are routed to be closer to x or farther
from y. The above discussion shows that R jx −Rix −
(
R jy − Riy
)
< 0 leads to ∂p
∗
i j
∂axy
< 0, which
is consistent with (16).
• Third, Theorem 4.1 implies that if θxy (i.e., the traffic demand on (x ,y)) is large and ξi j (i.e.,
the travel time on (i, j)) is small, axy has a large impact on p∗i j .
It is important to use the resistance-based analysis to derive the impact of axy on p∗i j . For example,
if we do not interpret λ∗i − λ∗j by effective resistances, it will be challenging to analyze the impact
of axy on λ∗i − λ∗j in (3).
7In this work, we use “closer” and “farther” to describe the change in the distance measured by the effective resistance in
the electrical network rather than the physical distance. The effective resistance is affected by the traffic demand and travel
time. Hence, when two locations are close to each other in the electrical network, there can be a large physical distance
between them.
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Based on Theorem 4.1, we can analyze the sign of ∂p
∗
i j
∂axy
when arcs (i, j) and (x ,y) have one
common vertex. We introduce the following corollary.
Corollary 4.2. For any (x ,y) ∈ A, its unit ad revenue’s impact on the optimal price for arc
(x , j) ∈ A (j , y) is given by ∂p
∗
x j
∂axy
=
θxy
4ξx j
(
R jx − R jy + Rxy
)
, which is non-negative.
The effective resistances among three locations satisfy the triangle inequality [10], which leads
to R jx − R jy + Rxy ≥ 0. Corollary 4.2 shows that when axy increases, the provider can increase px j
(j , y). This reduces the actual demand on (x , j), and enables the provider to offer more vehicles on
(x ,y). Similar to Corollary 4.2, we can analyze ∂p
∗
y j
∂axy
, ∂p
∗
ix
∂axy
, and
∂p∗iy
∂axy
(j , y, i , x ,y).
Next, we analyze some specific network topologies, and show that an arc’s price can be inde-
pendent of the unit ad revenue on another arc. Recall that the traffic demand (i.e.,
{
θi j
}
i, j ∈N) and
travel time (i.e.,
{
ξi j
}
i, j ∈N) define the edge weights of an undirected graph Gu. First, we introduce
the following Proposition.
Proposition 4.3. Suppose that Gu is a complete graph and all edges have the same weight. If arcs
(i, j) and (x ,y) do not have a common vertex, p∗i j does not change with axy .
When Gu is a complete graph and has homogeneous edge weights, the effective resistances
between different locations are the same. In this case, a vehicle’s distance to x or y does not change
after it travels from i to j (i , x ,y and j , x ,y). Based on our discussion in Remark 2, this implies
∂p∗i j
∂axy
= 0. Note that Proposition 4.3 only requires θi jξi j +
θ ji
ξ ji
(i.e., the edge weight) to be the same for
all i , j. The values of θi j and θ ji (or ξi j and ξ ji ) can be different.
Second, we consider the situation where Gu contains cut-vertices. When k is a cut-vertex, we
can remove it and its associated edges from Gu to get a graph (denoted by Gu − k) that has more
than one connected component. We introduce the following proposition.
Proposition 4.4. Suppose that k ∈ N is a cut-vertex of Gu, and N1 and N2 are the vertex sets of
two connected components of Gu − k . If i, j ∈ N1 ∪ {k} and x ,y ∈ N2 ∪ {k}, p∗i j does not change with
axy .
Proposition 4.4 implies that if the provider displays ads to the users traveling from x to y
(x ,y ∈ N2 ∪ {k}), only the prices for the arcs that are associated with vertices in N2 ∪ {k} may
change. We can see that this result can be applied to analyze the influence between arcs when Gu
is a star or a tree (e.g., the center vertex in a star graph is a cut-vertex).
In the last part of this section, we discuss the extension of the results to the general case (where
µ∗i j ≥ 0). Given the values of system parameters, we can compute µ∗i j for all (i, j) ∈ A and get
a modified electrical network (as discussed in Section 3.2). If µ∗i j > 0, p∗i j equals 1 and does not
change with axy ; otherwise, we can characterize
∂p∗i j
∂axy
by θˆxy , Rˆ jx , Rˆix , Rˆ jy , and Rˆiy (the effective
resistances are defined based on the modified electrical network) in a similar way as in Theorem
4.1. Note that as axy increases from zero to a large value, the set
{
(i, j) ∈ A : µ∗i j > 0
}
may change.
When this set changes, we need to update
{
θˆi j
}
i, j ∈N
, the electrical network, and the corresponding
effective resistances (i.e., Rˆ jx , Rˆix , Rˆ jy , and Rˆiy ).
5 PROVIDER PAYOFF AND CONSUMER SURPLUS
In this section, we study the provider’s payoff and consumer surplus under the optimal spatial
pricing, and show that they are non-decreasing in the unit ad revenues. We first focus on the
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µ∗i j = 0 case. By substituting the expression of p∗i j in (12) into the objective function in (2a), we can
compute the provider’s optimal (time-average) payoff, which is denoted by Πprovider and shown in
the following proposition.
Proposition 5.1. The provider’s payoff under
{
p∗i j
}
(i, j)∈A
is given by
Πprovider =
∑
(i, j)∈A
θi jξi j
(( 1 + ai j − c
2
)2
−
(∑
k ∈N
(
R jk − Rik
)
vk
4ξi j
)2)
. (17)
Then, we compute the consumer surplus under the optimal prices. In each time slot, the mass of
users that depart from i to j is θi j
(
1 − p∗i j
)
, and hence the mass of users traveling on arc (i, j) is
θi jξi j
(
1 − p∗i j
)
. For each of these users, its surplus is uniformly distributed in
[
0, 1 − p∗i j
]
. Therefore,
the consumer surplus for arc (i, j) is 12θi jξi j
(
1 − p∗i j
)2
. Considering all arcs in A, we can compute
the (time-average) total consumer surplus in the following proposition.
Proposition 5.2. The total consumer surplus under
{
p∗i j
}
(i, j)∈A
is given by
CS =
∑
(i, j)∈A
1
2θi jξi j
( 1 + ai j − c
2 −
∑
k ∈N
(
R jk − Rik
)
vk
4ξi j
)2
. (18)
It is challenging to compare Πprovider and CS. One analysis approach is to rearrange their expres-
sions in (17) and (18) based on the properties of effective resistances and vectorv . For example, we
need to use the following local sum rules of the resistances [8]:∑
j :(i, j)∈E
Ri j + Rik − R jk
ri j
= 2,∀i , k, i,k ∈ N . (19)
Recall that ri j is the resistance of the resistor between i and j and equals 1θi j
ξi j
+
θji
ξji
. After rearranging
(17) and (18), we can prove that Πprovider is proportional to CS, and introduce the following theorem.
Theorem 5.3. Under the optimal prices, the provider’s payoff is twice the consumer surplus, i.e.,
Πprovider = 2CS. Moreover, both Πprovider and CS are non-decreasing in axy for any (x ,y) ∈ A.
Remark 3: Theorem 5.3 shows the following results:
• First, Πprovider = 2CS. Under the optimal prices, the provider’s payoff from arc (i, j) is
θi jξi j
(
1 − p∗i j
) (
p∗i j + ai j − c
)
, and the consumer surplus on this arc is 12θi jξi j
(
1 − p∗i j
)2
. We
can compare these two expressions by substituting the result of p∗i j in (3) into them. We
can see that because of the flow balance constraints (i.e., the existence of λ∗i − λ∗j in (3)), the
provider’s payoff from (i, j) in general may not be twice the consumer surplus on this arc.
However, Theorem 5.3 shows that under the optimal prices, the provider’s total payoff is
always twice the total consumer surplus.
• Second, both Πprovider and CS are non-decreasing in axy . It is easy to prove that Πprovider is
non-decreasing in axy , because the provider’s payoff under any given pricing solution is
non-decreasing in axy . Since CS = 12Π
provider, CS is also non-decreasing in axy . This means
that if the provider receives sponsorship from an advertiser, displays ads to the users on
(x ,y), and changes its prices in the network based on axy , the total consumer surplus will not
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Fig. 2. An Example of Gd.
decrease. However, the consumer surplus on an arc may decrease. Since the consumer surplus
on arc (i, j) is 12θi jξi j
(
1 − p∗i j
)2
, whether it decreases with axy depends on
∂p∗i j
∂axy
, which is
characterized in Theorem 4.1.
In the above analysis, we consider the case where the system parameters lead to µ∗i j = 0 for
all (i, j) ∈ A. Next, we discuss the general case (µ∗i j ≥ 0). If µ∗i j > 0, then p∗i j = 1 and both the
provider’s payoff and consumer surplus on (i, j) are zero. We can compute Πprovider and CS by
θˆi j , Rˆ jk , Rˆik , and vˆk in similar ways as in (17) and (18). Furthermore, Theorem 5.3 still holds in
the general case, i.e., Πprovider = 2CS and both Πprovider and CS are non-decreasing in axy . This is
because the properties of effective resistances andv used in the proof of Theorem 5.3 (e.g., local
sum rules in (19)) also hold for the modified electrical network and
{
θˆi j
}
i, j ∈N
.
6 GUIDELINES FOR COLLABORATIONWITH ADVERTISERS
In this section, we provide guidelines for the provider regarding the advertisers to collaborate
with. Specifically, we let a ≜
(
ai j , (i, j) ∈ A
)
, and use Πprovider (a) to represent the provider’s
optimal payoff under the unit ad revenue vector a. When the provider collaborates with different
advertisers and displays different ads in the network, the corresponding values of a and Πprovider (a)
are different. We will study the provider’s optimal selection of advertisers, the corresponding a of
which leads to the highest Πprovider (a).
If there is no restriction on the number of advertisers that the provider collaborates with, the
provider can decide the ad display for different arcs separately. For an arc, the provider simply
displays ads for the advertiser that is willing to pay the most to the provider. For example, in Fig. 2,
advertiserA is willing to pay 0.2 if the provider displays its ads to a user on (1, 2) or (2, 3). Advertiser
B is willing to pay 0.1 for advertising to a user on (2, 3) or (3, 1). The provider can collaborate with
both advertisers by displaying advertiser A’s ads on (1, 2) and (2, 3) and advertiser B’s ads on (3, 1).
In this case, the corresponding a is given by (a12,a13,a23,a31) = (0.2, 0, 0.2, 0.1).
In practice, it can be time-consuming for the provider to establish collaboration with an advertiser.
Hence, the provider may only be able to collaborate with a limited number of advertisers (especially
when the provider just starts implementing the in-vehicle advertising). In this case, the provider’s ad
display decisions for different arcs may be coupled. Suppose that the provider can only collaborate
with one advertiser in the example in Fig. 2. Collaborating with advertiser A and collaborating
with advertiser B correspond to a = (0.2, 0, 0.2, 0) and a = (0, 0, 0.1, 0.1), respectively. The provider
should solve problem (2) and compute Πprovider (a) for the two different a (if µ∗i j = 0 for all (i, j) ∈ A,
Πprovider (a) is given by (17)). Then, the provider can decide its collaborator by comparingΠprovider (a)
under the two a vectors.
For a general network topology and a general parameter setting, when there is a restriction on
the number of collaborators, the provider can decide its collaborators based on a similar approach
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as described above. It can compute Πprovider (a) for each a that it can achieve through collaboration,
and then decide the optimal set of collaborators, which leads to the highest Πprovider (a).
In the rest of this section, we focus on two special cases to study the impact of the network
topology on the provider’s collaborator selection. In Section 6.1, we focus on the arc-based advertiser
case, where each advertiser is only willing to advertise on one arc. In Section 6.2, we focus on the
location-based advertiser case, where each advertiser is only willing to advertise on the arcs pointing
to one location. In both cases, we assume that the provider can only collaborate with one advertiser,
and analyze the provider’s optimal choice of this collaborator.
6.1 Collaboration with Arc-Based Advertisers
Suppose that there are |A| advertisers and each advertiser wants to advertise on an arc.8 Fur-
thermore, there do not exist advertisers who want to advertise on the same arc (otherwise, it is
trivial to compare these advertisers based on their willingnesses to pay). Hence, each arc (i, j) ∈ A
corresponds to an advertiser, and we use bi j to denote its willingness to pay.
When the provider can only collaborate with one advertiser, its problem is formulated as follows:
max
(x,y)∈A
Πprovider (a) (20a)
s.t. ai j =
{
bi j , if (i, j) = (x ,y) ,
0, otherwise, ∀ (i, j) ∈ A. (20b)
Here, (20b) gives a (i.e., the unit ad revenue vector) when the provider collaborates with the
advertiser corresponding to (x ,y). In Section 6.1.1, we consider the case where µ∗i j = 0 for all
(i, j) ∈ A, and characterize the provider’s optimal choice of (x ,y) based on the effective resistances.
In Section 6.1.2, we consider the general case (µ∗i j ≥ 0), where we can utilize the results in Section
6.1.1 to reduce the provider’s search space of its optimal choice of (x ,y).
6.1.1 µ∗i j = 0 Case. We consider the case where under each collaboration choice of (x ,y), the
corresponding a and the other system parameters lead to µ∗i j = 0 for all (i, j) ∈ A. In this case,
Πprovider (a) is given by (17). It is challenging to directly analyze the choice of (x ,y) that maximizes
the right side of (17). This is because vx and vy (defined in (6)) are affected by axy , and the square
terms −∑(i, j)∈A θi jξi j (∑k∈N(Rjk−Rik )vk4ξi j )2 in (17) complicate the coefficients of vx and vy . The
key step of our analysis is to rearrange the right side of (17) based on the local sum rules of the
resistances in (19) and get the expression shown in the following proposition.
Proposition 6.1. The provider’s optimal payoff Πprovider (a) in (17) equals ∆ (a), which is defined
as follows:
∆ (a) ≜
∑
(i, j)∈A
θi jξi j
( 1 + ai j − c
2
)2
−
∑
(i, j)∈A
(
1
8θi j
(
1 + ai j − c
) ∑
k ∈N
(
R jk − Rik
)
vk
)
, (21)
where vk depends on a and is defined in (6).
For a general parameter setting, we can substitute Πprovider (a) = ∆ (a) into (20a), and search for
the collaboration choice that maximizes ∆ (a). In particular, if θi j = θ ji for all (i, j) ∈ A, we can
simplify the comparison among ∆ (a) under different collaboration choices, and have the following
result (recall that
{
bi j
}
(i, j)∈A captures the advertisers’ willingnesses to pay).
8We consider |A | advertisers to simplify the presentation, and we can conduct a similar analysis if the number is not |A |.
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Fig. 3. An Example of Gd and its electrical network.
Theorem 6.2. If θi j = θ ji for all (i, j) ∈ A, the provider’s optimal collaboration choice is given by
(x ,y) = arg max
(i, j)∈A
θi jξi j
(
b2i j + 2 (1 − c)bi j
)
− θ 2i jb2i jRi j . (22)
Moreover, θi jξi j
(
b2i j + 2 (1 − c)bi j
)
− θ 2i jb2i jRi j increases with bi j for all (i, j) ∈ A.
Remark 4: Theorem 6.2 implies that when the provider selects one arc to collaborate with the
corresponding arc-based advertiser, it needs to consider the following two aspects:
• First, the mass of the users who want to travel on the selected arc should be large, and
the travel time should be long. This enables the provider to get a large total ad revenue by
displaying ads on this arc. In (22), this aspect is captured by θi jξi j
(
b2i j + 2 (1 − c)bi j
)
, which
increases with θi j and ξi j (i.e., the traffic demand and travel time on (i, j)).
• Second, the provider should be able to route enough vehicles from other arcs to the selected
arc. In (22), this aspect is captured by the term −θ 2i jb2i jRi j . Recall that Ri j is the effective
resistance between i and j , and is determined by
{
θi j , ξi j
}
i, j ∈N . Intuitively, a small Ri j implies
that there are many paths between i and j and these paths have large traffic demand and
short travel time.9 If θi j = θ ji for all (i, j) ∈ A, when an arc has a small effective resistance,
the provider can route a large mass of vehicles from other arcs to this arc. Hence, the provider
prefers to collaborate with the advertiser whose corresponding arc has a small effective
resistance.
The value of θi jξi j
(
b2i j + 2 (1 − c)bi j
)
−θ 2i jb2i jRi j increases with bi j , which means that an advertiser
with a higher willingness to pay is more likely to become the provider’s collaborator.
Next, we consider the situation where the arcs have homogeneous parameters to isolate the
impact of the network topology. The following corollary shows that the provider should select the
arc with the smallest effective resistance and collaborate with the corresponding advertiser.
Corollary 6.3. If θi j = θ ji = θ¯ , ξi j = ξ¯ , and bi j = b¯ for all (i, j) ∈ A, the provider’s optimal
collaboration choice is given by (x ,y) = arg min(i, j)∈ARi j .
Recall that Ri j = R ji for all i, j ∈ N . When the arcs’ parameters are homogeneous, if (x ,y) is an
optimal collaboration choice, (y,x) is also an optimal choice.
In the example in Fig. 3, if the traffic demand is θ¯ and the travel time is ξ¯ for all arcs in Gd, then
R25 = R52 =
3ξ¯
10θ¯ and the effective resistances of all the other arcs are
11ξ¯
30θ¯ . According to Corollary
9We illustrate an example of Gd and the corresponding electrical network in Fig. 3. We can see that R25 =
1
1
r25 +
1
r21+r16+R65
+ 1r23+r34+r45
. Since r21 = 1θ21
ξ21
+
θ12
ξ12
, the value of R25 decreases with θ21 and θ12 (i.e., traffic demand),
and increases with ξ21 and ξ12 (i.e., travel time).
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6.3, when the arc-based advertisers have the same willingness to pay, the provider should select
(2, 5) or (5, 2) to collaborate with the corresponding advertiser.
6.1.2 General Case. In the general case, under a collaboration choice of (x ,y), the corresponding
a and the other system parameters may lead to µ∗i j > 0 for some (i, j) ∈ A. In this case, Πprovider (a)
may not equal ∆ (a) in (21). For each collaboration choice of (x ,y), the provider can compute a
from (20b), and solve problem (2) to get Πprovider (a). Then, the provider’s optimal choice of (x ,y) is
the one that achieves the highest Πprovider (a).
Next, we show that the results in Section 6.1.1 can enable us to reduce the search space of the
optimal choice of (x ,y). The provider can perform the following steps:
Step 1: For each arc in A, the provider computes a from (20b) and further computes the corre-
sponding ∆ (a) in (21). Then, the provider sorts all arcs in descending order of their corresponding
∆ (a).
Step 2: Starting from the first arc (i.e., the one with the largest ∆ (a)), the provider sequentially
checks the arcs. Once the provider finds an arc such that the collaboration with the corresponding
advertiser leads to µ∗i j = 0 for all (i, j) ∈ A, the provider enters Step 3. We assume that this arc
has the h-th largest ∆ (a). If the provider cannot find such an arc after checking all arcs in A, we
simply let h = |A|.
Step 3: The provider only needs to compare these h arcs (based on their corresponding a and
Πprovider (a)) rather than all arcs in A to determine the optimal collaboration choice.
In Appendix N, we prove the optimality of the above steps. The main property used in the proof
is that in the general case, we have Πprovider (a) ≤ ∆ (a).
6.2 Collaboration with Location-Based Advertisers
Suppose that there are N advertisers and advertiser k ∈ N wants to advertise on the arcs pointing
to location k . For example, each advertiser plans to advertise a sale at its target location and only
display its ads to the users who will arrive at the target location (because of the advertiser’s budget
constraint). For all i ∈ N with (i,k) ∈ A, we use dik to denote advertiser k’s willingness to pay
if the provider displays its ads to a user on (i,k). We consider N advertisers with different target
locations to simplify the presentation, and our analysis can be easily extended to a general situation.
When the provider can only collaborate with one advertiser, the problem is formulated as follows:
max
m∈N
Πprovider (a) (23a)
s.t. ai j =
{
di j , if j =m,
0, otherwise, ∀ (i, j) ∈ A. (23b)
Here, (23b) gives a when the provider collaborates with advertiserm. Next, we focus on the case
where µ∗i j = 0 for all (i, j) ∈ A. The results can be used to reduce the search space of the optimal
collaboration choice for the general case (µ∗i j ≥ 0) in a similar way as in Section 6.1.2.
When µ∗i j = 0 for all (i, j) ∈ A, Πprovider (a) equals ∆ (a) in (21). For a general parameter setting,
we can solve problem (23) by searching for the collaboration choice that maximizes ∆ (a). In
particular, if θi j = θ ji for all (i, j) ∈ A, we can further simplify the comparison among ∆ (a) under
different collaboration choices, and have the following result.
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Fig. 4. An example of Gd. If k is a cut-vertex, the effective resistances between its incoming arcs’ origins (e.g.,
Rst ) will be large. In this situation, advertiser k is likely to be the provider’s optimal collaborator.
Theorem 6.4. If θi j = θ ji for all (i, j) ∈ A, the provider’s optimal collaboration choice is given by
m = arg max
k ∈N
∑
s :(s,k )∈A
θskξsk
(
d2sk + 2 (1 − c)dsk
)
+
∑
s :(s,k )∈A
∑
t :(t,k )∈A
1
2θskθtkdskdtk (Rst − Rsk − Rtk ) .
(24)
Remark 5: Theorem 6.4 characterizes the target location of the advertiser that the provider
should collaborate with:
• First, the location has many incoming arcs, the traffic demand on these arcs is large, and
the travel time on these arcs is long. In (24), these factors are captured by the expression∑
s :(s,k)∈A θskξsk
(
d2sk + 2 (1 − c)dsk
)
, which increases with the traffic demand and travel
time on each incoming arc of location k .
• Second, the effective resistances of the location’s incoming arcs are small, and the effec-
tive resistances between these incoming arcs’ origins are large. In (24), these are captured
by
∑
s :(s,k )∈A
∑
t :(t,k )∈A 12θskθtkdskdtk (−Rsk − Rtk + Rst ), which decreases with Rsk and Rtk
and increases with Rst . Both (s,k) and (t ,k) are location k’s incoming arcs. As discussed in
Remark 4, when an arc’s effective resistance (e.g., Rsk and Rtk ) is small, the provider can
route a large mass of vehicles from other arcs to this arc. Furthermore, when Rst is large,
there are few paths between s and t . In this situation, routing more vehicles to (s,k) does not
strongly reduce the mass of vehicles routed to (t ,k), and vice versa. Therefore, when Rsk and
Rtk are small and Rst is large, the provider is more likely to collaborate with advertiser k .
We use an example in Fig. 4 to illustrate that when Rst is large, the provider can route a large
mass of vehicles to (s,k) and (t ,k) at the same time. In Fig. 4, vertex k is a cut-vertex, and s and
t belong to different components (i.e., C1 and C2) if k is removed. Intuitively, Rst is large in this
situation. To route vehicles to (s,k) and (t ,k), the provider should route vehicles from the arcs
in C1 and the arcs in C2, respectively. Hence, routing more vehicles to (s,k) and to (t ,k) do not
strongly conflict with each other. Based on Remark 5 and Fig. 4, the provider can collaborate with
a location-based advertiser when its target location has incoming arcs originating from different
parts of the network.
In Sections 6.1 and 6.2, we focus on the situation where the provider can only collaborate with
one advertiser to simplify the presentation. Suppose that the provider can collaborate with multiple
arc-based or location-based advertisers. When µ∗i j = 0 for all (i, j) ∈ A, the provider’s optimal
payoff can still be simplified as ∆ (a) in (21), and the provider can simply select the collaboration
choice that maximizes ∆ (a).
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7 MODEL EXTENSIONS
In Section 7.1, we relax the assumptions made in Section 2, and introduce an extended model. In
Section 7.2, we validate our results about the provider’s advertiser selection choice in the extended
model using a real-world dataset.
7.1 Spatial Pricing in An Extended Model
In Section 2, we make three main assumptions to simplify the analysis: (i) the users’ reservation
prices are uniformly distributed; (ii) each vehicle sent on an arc carries a user; (iii) the provider has
sufficient vehicles to provide. In the extended model, we relax these assumptions as follows.
First, we use θi j
(
1 − F (pi j ) ) to represent the demand function on arc (i, j), where F (·) is a non-
decreasing function. If F
(
pi j
)
= min
{
pi j , 1
}
, the demand function becomes θi j max
{
1 − pi j , 0
}
.
This corresponds to the setting in Section 2, where the users have uniformly distributed reservation
prices.
Second, we allow the provider to also route empty vehicles, i.e., the vehicles that do not carry
users [7]. Sending empty vehicles from i to j does not directly generate revenue to the provider,
but it increases the supply of vehicles at j. We usewi j ≥ 0 to denote the mass of empty vehicles
that depart from i to j in each time slot. The cost of routing an empty vehicle is ηc (measured in
dollars per time slot), where η > 0 denotes the ratio between the costs of routing an empty vehicle
and a full vehicle (which carries a user).
Third, we use Ψ > 0 to denote the maximum mass of the vehicles (including both full and empty
vehicles) that can be sent to the network.
We formulate the provider’s spatial pricing problem in the extended model as follows:
max
∑
(i, j)∈A
ξi jθi j
(
1 − F (pi j ) ) (pi j + ai j − c ) −∑
i ∈N
∑
j ∈N
ξi jwi jηc (25a)
s.t.
∑
j :(i, j)∈A
θi j
(
1 − F (pi j ) ) +∑
j ∈N
wi j =
∑
j :(j,i)∈A
θ ji
(
1 − F (pji ) ) +∑
j ∈N
w ji ,∀i ∈ N , (25b)∑
(i, j)∈A
ξi jθi j
(
1 − F (pi j ) ) +∑
i ∈N
∑
j ∈N
ξi jwi j ≤ Ψ, (25c)
var. pi j ,∀ (i, j) ∈ A,wi j ≥ 0,∀i, j ∈ N . (25d)
The objective function in (25a) captures the provider’s time-average payoff. The constraint (25b)
captures the vehicle flow balance at each location i in the presence of empty car routing. The
constraint (25c) is the provider’s supply capacity constraint. In any time slot, the mass of full
vehicles on arc (i, j) is ξi jθi j
(
1 − F (pi j ) ) ,10 and the mass of empty vehicles traveling from i to j
is ξi jwi j . Constraint (25c) means that the total mass of vehicles in the network cannot exceed Ψ.
Problem (25) can be non-convex, and our analysis of the optimal pricing in Section 3 cannot be
directly applied here.
Note that when F
(
pi j
)
= min
{
pi j , 1
}
and both η and Ψ approach infinity, problem (25) reduces
to problem (2). Specifically, the demand function becomes θi j max
{
1 − pi j , 0
}
. We can further add
the constraint pi j ≤ 1, and write the demand as θi j
(
1 − pi j
)
.
10As discussed in Section 2.3, the provider will always choose pi j to ensure that there is no excess demand. As a result, the
mass of full vehicles that depart from i to j in each time slot equals the demand (i.e., θi j
(
1 − F (pi j ) )). We can multiply it
by ξi j (i.e., travel time) to get the mass of full vehicles on arc (i, j) in each time slot.
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Fig. 5. Rides’ Origins (Blue) and Destinations (Red).
7.2 Numerical Results
We validate our results about the provider’s optimal collaboration choice in the extended model.
We focus on the provider’s collaboration with location-based advertisers. Suppose that the provider
can only collaborate with one location-based advertiser. Similar to problem (23), the provider’s
optimal collaborator selection problem in the extended model is as follows:
max
m∈N
Π˜provider (a) (26a)
s.t. ai j =
{
di j , if j =m,
0, otherwise, ∀ (i, j) ∈ A, (26b)
where Π˜provider (a) represents the provider’s optimal payoff under the unit ad revenue vector a in
the extended model. Given a, Π˜provider (a) equals the optimal objective value of problem (25).
According to Section 6.2, in the basic model, the provider can simply select the collaboration
choice m that leads to the maximum ∆ (a) in (21).11 The numerical results will show that this
strategy can also yield a good solution to problem (26). Specifically, we compare the following three
advertiser selection strategies:
• Resistance-based selection: The provider selects them whose corresponding a leads to the
maximum ∆ (a);
• Optimal selection: The provider selectsm∗, which is the optimal solution to problem (26);
• Randomized selection: The provider randomly selectsm from set N .
We compare the values of Π˜provider (a) achieved by the three advertiser selection strategies. In
Sections 7.2.1 and 7.2.2, we show the results under different user demand functions.
11Based on our analysis, this strategy is optimal to the provider in the basic model if µ∗i j = 0 for all (i, j) ∈ A. Since this
condition usually holds in the numerical experiments, we consider this strategy in this section. We will show that this
strategy maximizes the provider’s payoff for most of the time.
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Fig. 6. Comparison Between Advertiser Selection Strategies.
7.2.1 Uniformly Distributed Reservation Prices. To focus on the impacts of the supply capacity
constraint and the empty car routing, we still consider the uniformly distributed user reservation
prices, i.e., we let F
(
pi j
)
= min
{
pi j , 1
}
.
We use a real-world dataset from DiDi Chuxing (the largest ride-sharing platform in China)
to generate
{
θi j , ξi j
}
i, j ∈N . The dataset includes information (e.g., origins, destinations, pick-up
time, and drop-off time) for the rides taken in November, 2016 in Chengdu, China [9]. We focus on
a 4.8 × 4.4 km2 area, which contains both residential and commercial districts. The range of the
latitude coordinate of the area is from 30.65 to 30.69, and the range of the longitude coordinate
is from 104.03 to 104.08. The commercial districts are mainly in the southeast of the area, and
the residential districts are mainly in the northwest. We analyze the rides whose (i) origins and
destinations are within this area and (ii) pick-up time and drop-off time are between 7 am and 9 am
on weekdays. In Fig. 5, we plot the origins and destinations of these rides. The origins are in blue
and the destinations are in red. Intuitively, most rides are from residential districts to commercial
districts during the considered time period. According to the distribution of the rides’ origins and
destinations, we divide the area into 15 locations (i.e., N = 15). For locations i and j (j , i), we set
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θi j to be the number of rides from i to j, and ξi j to be the average travel time of these rides. We
provide the details of the division of the area in Appendix P.
We set c = 0.6 and η = 0.8, and randomly choose the value for di j based on an exponential
distribution (with mean equal to 0.4). We compare the provider’s payoffs achieved by the three
advertiser selection strategies under different vehicle supply capacity Ψ. We change Ψ from 40
to 280, and run the experiment 50 times for each value of Ψ. In Fig. 6(a), we plot the provider’s
payoff against Ψ. First, we observe that the provider’s payoff is always non-decreasing in Ψ. This is
intuitive, since the provider can earn more revenue when it has more vehicles to provide. Second,
the gap between the payoffs under our resistance-based selection (blue curve) and the optimal
selection (red curve) is less than 0.7% of the payoff under the optimal selection. Our resistance-based
selection leads to the same advertiser collaboration choice as the optimal selection for most of
the time, and hence achieves a close-to-optimal provider’s payoff. Third, our resistance-based
selection achieves a much higher payoff than the randomized selection (green curve). For example,
when Ψ = 280, the resistance-based selection improves the provider’s payoff over the randomized
selection by 34.2%.
Then, we compare the three selection strategies under different η (i.e., the ratio between the
costs of routing an empty vehicle and a full vehicle). We let Ψ = 300, and the settings of c and
di j are the same as those in Fig. 6(a). We change η from 0.1 to 1, and run the experiment 50 times
for each value of η. In Fig. 6(b), we plot the provider’s payoff against η. First, we can see that the
provider’s payoff is non-increasing in η. This is because it is costly to route empty vehicles under a
large η. Second, our resistance-based selection achieves a close-to-optimal provider’s payoff, and
outperforms the randomized selection, which is similar to the result in Fig. 6(a).
7.2.2 Exponentially Distributed Reservation Prices. Next, we verify the observation in Section 7.2.1
by considering exponentially distributed user reservation prices.12 We let F
(
pi j
)
= 1 − e−γpi j
and choose γ = 2. This implies that the reservation prices of the θi j users on (i, j) ∈ A follow
an exponential distribution with mean equal to 0.5. In [11], real data shows that the exponential
function can well approximate the actual user demand function for a ride-sharing platform’s service.
Reference [20] also modeled riders’ demand function by an exponential function.
We compare the three advertiser selection strategies under different Ψ (the results of their
comparison under different η are similar to those in Fig. 6(b), and hence are omitted). The parameter
settings are the same as those in Fig. 6(a). In Fig. 6(c), we plot the provider’s payoff against Ψ. We
can see that the gap between the payoffs under our resistance-based selection and the optimal
selection is greater than that in the uniformly distributed reservation price case (shown in Fig.
6(a)). The gap is up to 6% of the payoff under the optimal selection. However, our resistance-based
selection has a much lower computation complexity. It only requires the provider to compute ∆ (a)
(which has a closed-form expression in (21)) for each collaboration choice and do the comparison.
In contrast, the optimal selection requires the provider to compute Π˜provider (a) (i.e., the optimal
objective value of problem (25)) for each collaboration choice and do the comparison. In each of
our experiments, the time required for our resistance-based selection and the optimal selection
to determine the advertiser selection choice in MATLAB are around 0.2 seconds and 9 minutes,
respectively. Fig. 6(c) also shows that the resistance-based selection outperforms the randomized
selection. When Ψ = 280, the resistance-based selection improves the provider’s payoff over the
randomized selection by 31.7%.
12Besides the uniform distribution and exponential distribution, some other distributions have been used to model the
distribution of users’ reservation prices. For example, reference [3] considered a general Gamma distribution.
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From Fig. 6(a), 6(b), and 6(c), our resistance-based advertiser selection achieves a high provider’s
payoff in the extended model. Under the resistance-based selection, the provider selects the col-
laborator whose corresponding a leads to the maximum ∆ (a). Therefore, the numerical results
imply that the comparison among Π˜provider (a) under different collaboration choices can be well
approximated by the comparison among ∆ (a). Recall that in the basic model, we have used ∆ (a)
to derive many insights about the provider’s collaboration with the advertisers (e.g., Remarks 4
and 5). Since the comparison of ∆ (a) can well approximate the comparison of Π˜provider (a), these
insights also hold in the extended model.
8 CONCLUSION
In-vehicle advertising is a promising approach to monetize a vehicle service, especially an au-
tonomous vehicle service. We analyzed in-vehicle advertising’s economic impact based on effective
resistances, and derived the following insights. First, if an arc has a long travel time, the network
topology and other arcs’ ad revenues have a small impact on the arc’s optimal price. Second, in-
creasing an arc’s ad revenue may reduce some arcs’ consumer surplus, but does not reduce the total
consumer surplus. Third, the provider should collaborate with a location-based advertiser whose
target location has incoming arcs originating from locations in different parts of the network.
There are some limitations to our study, which may open up directions for future research.
First, we considered time-invariant user demand and travel time. One extension is to model the
system by a closed-queueing network [2, 7], where the arrival of user requests on an arc follows a
Poisson process and the travel time follows an exponential distribution. Given a pricing and vehicle
assignment policy, the number of vehicles on different arcs can be characterized by a continuous
time Markov chain. As studied in [7], we may prove that the closed-queueing network can be
approximated by a fluid model under a fixed pricing and vehicle assignment policy. Therefore, we
can leverage the fluid model to design the pricing and vehicle assignment policy in the presence
of ad revenues. Second, our work focuses on a monopolistic provider. When multiple providers
offer the vehicle service, users choose the providers based on the providers’ service prices and
vehicle availabilities. Each provider decides its pricing and vehicle assignment by anticipating
users’ choices. Since each provider needs to consider its own vehicle flow balance constraints at all
locations, the analysis of providers’ decisions in the equilibrium is challenging. If the providers
have limited vehicle supplies, they may offer the service in different regions in the equilibrium to
reduce their competition. It is also interesting to study the impact of the in-vehicle advertising
on the providers’ competition. Third, we did not consider the influence of vehicle assignment on
the travel time on different arcs. In practice, when the number of vehicles on an arc is large, the
corresponding roads can be congested, which may lead to a large travel time on the arc. Fourth,
we investigated a general vehicle service provider in this work. We can focus on a ride-sharing
platform and analyze its spatial compensation to drivers considering the ad revenues.
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A PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3.1
Proof. The objective function in (2a) is quadratic and concave, and the constraints (2b) are
affine. In this case, problem (2) is convex, and the KKT conditions are necessary and sufficient for
optimality. Based on the stationarity condition, we have the following relation:
θi jξi j
(
2p∗i j − 1 − c + ai j
)
− λ∗i θi j + λ∗jθi j + µ∗i j = 0,∀ (i, j) ∈ A. (27)
After rearrangement, we can get the expression of p∗i j :
p∗i j =
1 − ai j + c
2 +
λ∗i − λ∗j
2ξi j
−
µ∗i j
2ξi jθi j
,∀ (i, j) ∈ A. (28)
□
B PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3.2
Proof. First, we show that λ = L+v is one solution to Lλ = v . Given the Laplacian matrix L
and its generalized inverse L+, we have the following property [6]:
LL+ = I − 1
N
J , (29)
where I is the N ×N identity matrix and J is the N ×N all-ones matrix (whose entries are 1). Then,
we can see that
LL+v = Iv − 1
N
Jv = v, (30)
where we use
∑
k ∈N vk = 0 (which is obtained based onv’s definition in (6)) to derive the second
equality. According to (30), λ = L+v is one solution to Lλ = v .
Second, we prove that the solution space of Lλ = v is {λ : λ = L+v + β (1, 1, . . . , 1)⊺ , β ∈ R}.
Let λ1 and λ2 be two solutions to Lλ = v . We can see that L (λ1 − λ2) = 0. Since L is the Laplacian
matrix, its null space is one-dimensional and it satisfies L (1, 1, . . . , 1)⊺ = 0. Therefore, vector
(1, 1, . . . , 1)⊺ belongs to the null space, and there exists β ∈ R such that λ1 − λ2 = β (1, 1, . . . , 1)⊺.
Because the result holds for any two solutions of Lλ = v , the solution space of Lλ = v is
characterized by {λ : λ = L+v + β (1, 1, . . . , 1)⊺ , β ∈ R}.
Since any solution of Lλ = v can be written in the form of λ = L+v + β (1, 1, . . . , 1)⊺ for some
β ∈ R, the value of λi − λj (i, j ∈ N ) equals ∑k ∈N (l+ik − l+jk ) vk . □
C PROOF OF THEOREM 3.3
Proof. From (10), we have the following relations for all i, j,k ∈ N :
l+ik =
l+ii + l
+
kk − Rik
2 , (31)
l+jk =
l+j j + l
+
kk − R jk
2 . (32)
According to (9), if µ∗i j = 0 for all (i, j) ∈ A, then λ∗i − λ∗j =
∑
k ∈N
(
l+ik − l+jk
)
vk for all i, j ∈ N . By
substituting the expressions of l+ik and l
+
jk into the expression of λ
∗
i − λ∗j , we get the following result
for all i, j ∈ N :
λ∗i − λ∗j =
∑
k ∈N
(
l+ii + l
+
kk − Rik
2 −
(
l+j j + l
+
kk − R jk
2
))
vk =
∑
k ∈N
(
l+ii − Rik − l+j j + R jk
2
)
vk . (33)
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Because
∑
k ∈N vk = 0, we have
∑
k ∈N l+iivk = 0 and
∑
k ∈N l+j jvk = 0. Hence, the value of λ∗i − λ∗j
(i, j ∈ N ) is given by
λ∗i − λ∗j =
1
2
∑
k ∈N
(
R jk − Rik
)
vk . (34)
When µ∗i j = 0 for all (i, j) ∈ A, we substitute the above expression into (3), and have
p∗i j =
1 − ai j + c
2 +
1
4ξi j
∑
k ∈N
(
R jk − Rik
)
vk ,∀ (i, j) ∈ A. (35)
□
D PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3.4
Proof. We first prove that when the system parameters satisfy the condition
∑
k ∈N |vk | ≤
min(x,y)∈A 2
(
θxy + θyx
ξxy
ξyx
) (
1 + axy − c
)
, the following inequality holds for all (i, j) ∈ A:
1 − ai j + c
2 +
1
4ξi j
∑
k ∈N
(
R jk − Rik
)
vk ≤ 1. (36)
Because the effective resistances satisfy the triangle inequality [10], we have R jk − Rik ≤ Ri j and
Rik − R jk ≤ Ri j . Moreover, the effective resistance between two locations is always no greater than
the resistance of the resistor between them, which implies that Ri j ≤ ri j . Since ri j = 1θi j
ξi j
+
θji
ξji
, the
following inequality holds: R jk − Rik  ≤ 1θi j
ξi j
+
θ ji
ξ ji
. (37)
Using this inequality, we can further see that
1 − ai j + c
2 +
1
4ξi j
∑
k ∈N
(
R jk − Rik
)
vk
≤ 1 − ai j + c2 +
1
4ξi j
∑
k ∈N
R jk − Rik  |vk |
≤ 1 − ai j + c2 +
1
4ξi j
1
θi j
ξi j
+
θ ji
ξ ji
∑
k ∈N
|vk | . (38)
When
∑
k ∈N |vk | ≤ min(x,y)∈A 2
(
θxy + θyx
ξxy
ξyx
) (
1 + axy − c
)
, the right side of (38) is upper bounded
as follows:
1 − ai j + c
2 +
1
4ξi j
1
θi j
ξi j
+
θ ji
ξ ji
∑
k ∈N
|vk |
≤ 1 − ai j + c2 +
1
2ξi j
1
θi j
ξi j
+
θ ji
ξ ji
min
(x,y)∈A
(
θxy + θyx
ξxy
ξyx
) (
1 + axy − c
)
≤ 1 − ai j + c2 +
1
2
1
θi j + θ ji
ξi j
ξ ji
(
θi j + θ ji
ξi j
ξ ji
) (
1 + ai j − c
)
= 1. (39)
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Combining (38) and (39), we can prove that if
∑
k ∈N |vk | ≤min(x,y)∈A 2
(
θxy + θyx
ξxy
ξyx
) (
1 + axy − c
)
,
the following inequality holds for all (i, j) ∈ A:
1 − ai j + c
2 +
1
4ξi j
∑
k ∈N
(
R jk − Rik
)
vk ≤ 1. (40)
Then, we let pi j =
1−ai j+c
2 +
1
4ξi j
∑
k ∈N
(
R jk − Rik
)
vk and µi j = 0 for all (i, j) ∈ A, and let λ be
the solution to Lλ = v . From (40), pi j ≤ 1 for all (i, j) ∈ A. We can verify that
{
pi j , µi j
}
(i, j)∈A and
λ satisfy the KKT conditions. Hence, they constitute an optimal solution to problem (2). □
E PROOF OF THEOREM 4.1
Proof. From (12), the optimal price for arc (i, j) is as follows:
p∗i j =
1 − ai j + c
2 +
1
4ξi j
∑
k ∈N
(
R jk − Rik
)
vk ,∀ (i, j) ∈ A, (41)
where vk is given by
vk =
∑
m:(k,m)∈A
θkm (1 + akm − c) −
∑
m:(m,k )∈A
θmk (1 + amk − c) . (42)
By taking the derivative of p∗i j with respect to axy , we can get the following relation:
∂p∗i j
∂axy
= −121{i=x, j=y } +
θxy
4ξi j
(
R jx − Rix − R jy + Riy
)
. (43)
In particular, when i = x and j = y, the above equality becomes
∂p∗xy
∂axy
= −12 +
θxy
4ξxy
(
Ryx − Rxx − Ryy + Rxy
)
= −12 +
θxy
2ξxy
Rxy , (44)
where the second equality is based on Rxx = Ryy = 0 and Rxy = Ryx . The effective resistance
between two locations is always no greater than the resistance of the resistor between them. Hence,
Rxy ≤ rxy = 1θxy
ξxy
+
θyx
ξyx
. Using this inequality, we can see that
∂p∗xy
∂axy
≤ −12 +
θxy
2ξxy
1
θxy
ξxy
+
θyx
ξyx
≤ 0. (45)
□
F PROOF OF COROLLARY 4.2
Proof. When i = x and j , y, Eq. (16) becomes
∂p∗x j
∂axy
=
θxy
4ξx j
(
R jx − Rxx − R jy + Rxy
)
=
θxy
4ξx j
(
R jx − R jy + Rxy
)
. (46)
The second equality is based on Rxx = 0. According to the triangle inequality of effective resistances
[10], we have R jx − R jy + Rxy ≥ 0. Hence, the value of ∂p
∗
x j
∂axy
is non-negative. □
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G PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4.3
Proof. When Gu is a complete graph and has homogeneous edge weights, there is a resistor
between any two nodes (i.e., locations) in the electrical network. Moreover, these resistors have
the same resistance. In this case, the effective resistances between different locations are the same.
Hence, if arcs (i, j) and (x ,y) do not have a common vertex, Eq. (16) becomes
∂p∗i j
∂axy
=
θxy
4ξi j
(
R jx − Rix − R jy + Riy
)
= 0, (47)
where the second equality is based on R jx = Rix = R jy = Riy . We can see that p∗i j does not change
with axy . □
H PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4.4
Proof. Recall that the effective resistance between two locations is defined as the voltage
between them when a unit current is injected at one location and withdrawn at the other location.
Since N1 and N2 are the vertex sets of two connected components of Gu − k , if i ∈ N1 ∪ {k} and
x ∈ N2 ∪ {k}, vertex k is on all paths between i and x . Then, the effective resistances between
i , x , and k satisfy Rix = Rik + Rkx . Similarly, for i, j ∈ N1 ∪ {k} and x ,y ∈ N2 ∪ {k}, we have
R jx = R jk + Rkx , R jy = R jk + Rky , and Riy = Rik + Rky . Based on these four equations, we can see
that R jx − Rix and R jy − Riy are equal (i.e., R jx − Rix = R jy − Riy = R jk − Rik ).
According to (16), ∂p
∗
i j
∂axy
is given by
∂p∗i j
∂axy
= −121{i=x, j=y } +
θxy
4ξi j
(
R jx − Rix − R jy + Riy
)
. (48)
For i, j ∈ N1 ∪ {k} and x ,y ∈ N2 ∪ {k}, the relations i = x and j = y cannot hold in the same time.
This means that 1{i=x, j=y } = 0. As analyzed above, R jx − Rix and R jy − Riy are equal. Therefore,
the value of ∂p
∗
i j
∂axy
is zero, which implies that p∗i j does not change with axy . □
I PROOFS OF PROPOSITIONS 5.1 AND 5.2
Proof. First, as shown in (2a), the provider’s payoff equals
∑
(i, j)∈A θi jξi j
(
1 − pi j
) (
pi j + ai j − c
)
.
Its optimal pricing is given by p∗i j =
1−ai j+c
2 +
1
4ξi j
∑
k ∈N
(
R jk − Rik
)
vk . Hence, the provider’s payoff
under the optimal pricing is
Πprovider =
∑
(i, j)∈A
θi jξi j
(( 1 + ai j − c
2
)2
−
(∑
k ∈N
(
R jk − Rik
)
vk
4ξi j
)2)
. (49)
Second, as discussed in Section 5, the total consumer surplus equals
∑
(i, j)∈A 12θi jξi j
(
1 − pi j
)2.
By substituting the expression of p∗i j into it, we have
CS =
∑
(i, j)∈A
1
2θi jξi j
( 1 + ai j − c
2 −
∑
k ∈N
(
R jk − Rik
)
vk
4ξi j
)2
. (50)
□
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J PROOF OF THEOREM 5.3
Proof. First, to simplify the presentation, we represent Πprovider and CS using the optimal dual
variables λ∗ as follows:
Πprovider =
∑
(i, j)∈A
θi jξi j
(
1 + ai j − c
2 −
λ∗i − λ∗j
2ξi j
) (
1 + ai j − c
2 +
λ∗i − λ∗j
2ξi j
)
, (51)
CS =
∑
(i, j)∈A
1
2θi jξi j
(
1 + ai j − c
2 −
λ∗i − λ∗j
2ξi j
)2
. (52)
Second, we compute Πprovider − 2CS, and the detailed steps are shown as follows.
Πprovider − 2CS
=
∑
(i, j)∈A
θi j
(
1 + ai j − c
2 −
λ∗i − λ∗j
2ξi j
) (
λ∗i − λ∗j
)
=
∑
(i, j)∈A
θi j
(
1 + ai j − c
2 −
λ∗i − λ∗j
2ξi j
)
λ∗i −
∑
(i, j)∈A
θi j
(
1 + ai j − c
2 −
λ∗i − λ∗j
2ξi j
)
λ∗j
(a)
=
∑
i ∈N
∑
j ∈N
θi j
(
1 + ai j − c
2 −
λ∗i − λ∗j
2ξi j
)
λ∗i −
∑
i ∈N
∑
j ∈N
θi j
(
1 + ai j − c
2 −
λ∗i − λ∗j
2ξi j
)
λ∗j
=
∑
i ∈N
∑
j ∈N
θi j
(
1 + ai j − c
2 −
λ∗i − λ∗j
2ξi j
)
λ∗i −
∑
i ∈N
∑
j ∈N
θ ji
(
1 + aji − c
2 −
λ∗j − λ∗i
2ξ ji
)
λ∗i
=
1
2
∑
i ∈N
λ∗i
∑
j ∈N
(
θi j
(
1 + ai j − c
) − θ ji (1 + aji − c ) ) − 12 ∑
i ∈N
λ∗i
∑
j ∈N
(
θi j
ξi j
+
θ ji
ξ ji
) (
λ∗i − λ∗j
)
(b)
=
1
2
∑
i ∈N
λ∗ivi −
1
2
∑
i ∈N
λ∗i
∑
j ∈N
(
θi j
ξi j
+
θ ji
ξ ji
) (
λ∗i − λ∗j
)
=
1
2
∑
i ∈N
λ∗i
©­«vi −
∑
j ∈N
(
θi j
ξi j
+
θ ji
ξ ji
) (
λ∗i − λ∗j
)ª®¬
(c)
=
1
2
∑
i ∈N
λ∗i
©­«vi −
∑
j ∈N
(
θi j
ξi j
+
θ ji
ξ ji
) (
1
2
∑
k ∈N
(
R jk − Rik
)
vk
)ª®¬ . (53)
We use the fact that θi j = 0 for all (i, j) < A to derive equality (a). We again use this fact and the
definition of vi in (6) to derive equality (b). When deriving equality (c), we use the result of λ∗i − λ∗j
in (11).
Third, we analyze
∑
j ∈N
(
θi j
ξi j
+
θ ji
ξ ji
) ( 1
2
∑
k ∈N
(
R jk − Rik
)
vk
)
, which is part of the result in (53).
According to the local sum rules of the resistances [8] (shown in (19) in our paper), we have
∑
j :(i, j)∈E
Ri j + Rik − R jk
ri j
= 2,∀i , k, i,k ∈ N . (54)
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Using ri j = 1θi j
ξi j
+
θji
ξji
and the fact that θi j = θ ji = 0 when (i, j) < E, we can rewrite the above
equation as follows: ∑
j ∈N
(
θi j
ξi j
+
θ ji
ξ ji
) (
Ri j + Rik − R jk
)
= 2,∀i , k, i,k ∈ N . (55)
By rearranging the above equation, we get the following relation:
∑
j ∈N
(
θi j
ξi j
+
θ ji
ξ ji
) (
R jk − Rik
)
=
©­«
∑
j ∈N
(
θi j
ξi j
+
θ ji
ξ ji
)
Ri j
ª®¬ − 2,∀i , k, i,k ∈ N . (56)
Next, we rearrange
∑
j ∈N
(
θi j
ξi j
+
θ ji
ξ ji
) ( 1
2
∑
k ∈N
(
R jk − Rik
)
vk
)
and show the steps as follows.
∑
j ∈N
(
θi j
ξi j
+
θ ji
ξ ji
) (
1
2
∑
k ∈N
(
R jk − Rik
)
vk
)
=
1
2
∑
k ∈N
∑
j ∈N
(
θi j
ξi j
+
θ ji
ξ ji
) (
R jk − Rik
)
vk
=
1
2
∑
k,i,k ∈N
©­«vk
∑
j ∈N
(
θi j
ξi j
+
θ ji
ξ ji
) (
R jk − Rik
)ª®¬ + 12
∑
j ∈N
(
θi j
ξi j
+
θ ji
ξ ji
) (
R ji − Rii
)
vi
(a)
=
1
2
∑
k,i,k ∈N
©­«©­«
∑
j ∈N
(
θi j
ξi j
+
θ ji
ξ ji
)
Ri j
ª®¬ − 2ª®¬vk + 12
∑
j ∈N
(
θi j
ξi j
+
θ ji
ξ ji
)
R jivi
=
1
2
∑
k,i,k ∈N
©­«
∑
j ∈N
(
θi j
ξi j
+
θ ji
ξ ji
)
Ri j
ª®¬vk + 12
∑
j ∈N
(
θi j
ξi j
+
θ ji
ξ ji
)
R jivi −
∑
k,i,k ∈N
vk
=
1
2
∑
j ∈N
∑
k,i,k ∈N
(
θi j
ξi j
+
θ ji
ξ ji
)
Ri jvk +
1
2
∑
j ∈N
(
θi j
ξi j
+
θ ji
ξ ji
)
R jivi −
∑
k,i,k ∈N
vk
(b)
=
1
2
∑
j ∈N
∑
k,i,k ∈N
(
θi j
ξi j
+
θ ji
ξ ji
)
Ri jvk +
1
2
∑
j ∈N
(
θi j
ξi j
+
θ ji
ξ ji
)
Ri jvi −
∑
k,i,k ∈N
vk
=
1
2
∑
j ∈N
(
θi j
ξi j
+
θ ji
ξ ji
)
Ri j
(( ∑
k,i,k ∈N
vk
)
+vi
)
−
∑
k,i,k ∈N
vk
(c)
=vi . (57)
We can see that
∑
j ∈N
(
θi j
ξi j
+
θ ji
ξ ji
) ( 1
2
∑
k ∈N
(
R jk − Rik
)
vk
)
equalsvi . Specifically, we use (56) and
Rii = 0 to get equality (a), and use R ji = Ri j to get equality (b). When deriving equality (c), we use
the fact that
∑
k ∈N vk = 0. Combining (53) and (57), we can prove that Πprovider − 2CS = 0.
Fourth, from the provider’s problem (2), we can see that given any pricing, the provider’s payoff
is non-decreasing in axy for any (x ,y) ∈ A. Hence, the provider’s optimal payoff is non-decreasing
in axy . Because Πprovider = 2CS, we can see that CS is also non-decreasing in axy . □
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K PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6.1
Proof. There are two approaches to derive ∆ (a) using the local sum rules. Here, we introduce
the first approach. The first step is to prove Πprovider = 2CS based on the local sum rules. The details
of the proof are given in Section J. Then, we have the following two (equivalent) expressions for
Πprovider:
Πprovider =
∑
(i, j)∈A
θi jξi j
(( 1 + ai j − c
2
)2
−
(∑
k ∈N
(
R jk − Rik
)
vk
4ξi j
)2)
, (58)
Πprovider =
∑
(i, j)∈A
θi jξi j
( 1 + ai j − c
2 −
∑
k ∈N
(
R jk − Rik
)
vk
4ξi j
)2
. (59)
The first expression is from (17), and the second expression is from Πprovider = 2CS and (18).
The second step is to rearrange
∑
(i, j)∈A θi jξi j
(∑
k∈N(Rjk−Rik )vk
4ξi j
)2
. Because the right sides of (58)
and (59) are equal, we can derive the following results:
∑
(i, j)∈A
θi jξi j
(( 1 + ai j − c
2
)2
−
(∑
k ∈N
(
R jk − Rik
)
vk
4ξi j
)2)
=
∑
(i, j)∈A
θi jξi j
( 1 + ai j − c
2 −
∑
k ∈N
(
R jk − Rik
)
vk
4ξi j
)2
⇔
∑
(i, j)∈A
θi jξi j
( 1 + ai j − c
2
)2
−
∑
(i, j)∈A
θi jξi j
(∑
k ∈N
(
R jk − Rik
)
vk
4ξi j
)2
=
∑
(i, j)∈A
θi jξi j
( 1 + ai j − c
2
)2
+
∑
(i, j)∈A
θi jξi j
(∑
k ∈N
(
R jk − Rik
)
vk
4ξi j
)2
−
∑
(i, j)∈A
θi jξi j
(
1 + ai j − c
) (∑k ∈N (R jk − Rik ) vk
4ξi j
)
⇔
∑
(i, j)∈A
θi jξi j
(∑
k ∈N
(
R jk − Rik
)
vk
4ξi j
)2
=
∑
(i, j)∈A
1
8θi j
(
1 + ai j − c
) (∑
k ∈N
(
R jk − Rik
)
vk
)
. (60)
Hence,
∑
(i, j)∈Aθi jξi j
(∑
k∈N(Rjk−Rik )vk
4ξi j
)2
equals
∑
(i, j)∈A 18θi j
(
1 + ai j − c
) (∑
k ∈N
(
R jk − Rik
)
vk
)
.
Then, we can replace the term
∑
(i, j)∈A θi jξi j
(∑
k∈N(Rjk−Rik )vk
4ξi j
)2
in the optimal payoff in (58) by∑
(i, j)∈A 18θi j
(
1 + ai j − c
) (∑
k ∈N
(
R jk − Rik
)
vk
)
, and get the following result:
Πprovider =
∑
(i, j)∈A
θi jξi j
( 1 + ai j − c
2
)2
−
∑
(i, j)∈A
(
1
8θi j
(
1 + ai j − c
) ∑
k ∈N
(
R jk − Rik
)
vk
)
, (61)
where the right side is ∆ (a). □
L PROOF OF THEOREM 6.2
Proof. When the provider collaborates with the advertiser corresponding to arc (x ,y), it only
has a positive unit ad revenue on arc (x ,y), i.e., axy = bxy and ai j = 0 for other arcs. Based on this
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and the condition that θi j = θ ji for all (i, j) ∈ A, we can compute the provider’s payoff under the
collaboration choice (x ,y) as follows.
Πprovider
=
∑
(i, j)∈A
θi jξi j
( 1 + ai j − c
2
)2
−
∑
(i, j)∈A
(
1
8θi j
(
1 + ai j − c
) ∑
k ∈N
(
R jk − Rik
)
vk
)
=
∑
(i, j),(x,y),(i, j)∈A
θi jξi j
(
1 − c
2
)2
+ θxyξxy
( 1 + bxy − c
2
)2
−
∑
(i, j),(x,y),(i, j)∈A
(
1
8θi j (1 − c)
∑
k ∈N
(
R jk − Rik
)
vk
)
− 18θxy
(
1 + bxy − c
) ∑
k ∈N
(
Ryk − Rxk
)
vk
=
∑
(i, j)∈A
θi jξi j
(
1 − c
2
)2
+ θxyξxy
(
bxy
2
)2
+ θxyξxy
bxy
2 (1 − c)
−
∑
(i, j)∈A
(
1
8θi j (1 − c)
∑
k ∈N
(
R jk − Rik
)
vk
)
− 18θxybxy
∑
k ∈N
(
Ryk − Rxk
)
vk
(a)
=
∑
(i, j)∈A
θi jξi j
(
1 − c
2
)2
+ θxyξxy
(
bxy
2
)2
+ θxyξxy
bxy
2 (1 − c) −
1
8θxybxy
∑
k ∈N
(
Ryk − Rxk
)
vk
(b)
=
∑
(i, j)∈A
θi jξi j
(
1 − c
2
)2
+ θxyξxy
(
bxy
2
)2
+ θxyξxy
bxy
2 (1 − c)
− 18θxybxy
( (
Ryy − Rxy
) (−θxybxy ) + (Ryx − Rxx ) θxybxy )
(c)
=
∑
(i, j)∈A
θi jξi j
(
1 − c
2
)2
+ θxyξxy
(
bxy
2
)2
+ θxyξxy
bxy
2 (1 − c) −
1
4θ
2
xyb
2
xyRxy . (62)
Note that when θi j = θ ji for all (i, j) ∈ A, we have the following relation:
1
8θ ji (1 − c)
∑
k ∈N
(
Rik − R jk
)
vk =
1
8θi j (1 − c)
∑
k ∈N
(
Rik − R jk
)
vk =−18θi j (1 − c)
∑
k ∈N
(
R jk − Rik
)
vk .
(63)
This implies that the sum of 18θ ji (1 − c)
∑
k ∈N
(
Rik − R jk
)
vk and 18θi j (1 − c)
∑
k ∈N
(
R jk − Rik
)
vk
is zero. If (i, j) ∈ A, since θi j = θ ji for all (i, j) ∈ A, we have (j, i) ∈ A. Therefore, we can derive
equality (a) in (62). According to the definition of vi in (6), when θi j = θ ji for all (i, j) ∈ A and the
provider only collaborates with (x ,y), we can see that vx = θxybxy , vy = −θxybxy , and vi = 0 for
i , x ,y. This enables us to derive equality (b). When deriving equality (c), we use the property that
Ryy = 0, Rxx = 0, and Ryx = Rxy .
The provider needs to select (x ,y) to maximize its payoff in (62). We can see that the term∑
(i, j)∈A θi jξi j
( 1−c
2
)2 does not change with the provider’s choice of (x ,y). Hence, the provider
should select (x ,y) to maximize the following expression:
1
4θxyξxyb
2
xy +
1
2θxyξxybxy (1 − c) −
1
4θ
2
xyb
2
xyRxy . (64)
We can multiply it by 4, which corresponds to the expression to be maximized in Theorem 6.2.
Proc. ACM Meas. Anal. Comput. Syst., Vol. 3, No. 1, Article 6. Publication date: January 2019.
Location-Based Advertising 6:33
At last, we prove that (64) increases with bxy for all (x ,y) ∈ A. In (64), the coefficient of b2xy
is 14θxy
(
ξxy − θxyRxy
)
. The effective resistance between two locations is always no greater than
the resistance of the resistor between them. Hence, Rxy ≤ rxy = 1θxy
ξxy
+
θyx
ξyx
≤ ξxyθxy . This means
that the coefficient of b2xy in (64) is non-negative. Moreover, since c < 1 (i.e., the assumption of c
in the model), the coefficient of bxy in (64) is positive. Therefore, (64) increases with bxy for all
(x ,y) ∈ A. □
M PROOF OF COROLLARY 6.3
Proof. If θi j = θ ji = θ¯ , ξi j = ξ¯ , and bi j = b¯ for all (i, j) ∈ A, (22) becomes
(x ,y) = arg max
(i, j)∈A
θ¯ ξ¯
(
b¯2 + 2 (1 − c) b¯) − θ¯ 2b¯2Ri j . (65)
The term θ¯ ξ¯
(
b¯2 + 2 (1 − c) b¯) is independent of the choice (x ,y). We can see that the above condition
for choosing (x ,y) is equivalent to (x ,y) = arg min(i, j)∈ARi j . □
N OPTIMALITY OF SEARCH STEPS IN SECTION 6.1.2
We show that the steps which we introduce to search for the collaboration choice (x ,y) lead to
the optimal collaboration choice. We only need to prove that when h < |A|, the provider’s payoff
when it collaborates with the advertiser corresponding to the h-th arc is no less than its payoff
when it collaborates with the advertiser corresponding to the i-th arc (i > h). Recall that the arcs
are sorted in their descending order of their corresponding ∆ (a).
To simplify the presentation, we introduce some new notations. We use l˜i (1 ≤ i ≤ |A|) to denote
the arc with the i-th largest ∆ (a). Moreover, we use al˜i to denote the unit ad revenue vector when
the provider collaborates with the advertiser corresponding to l˜i . Hence, we have the following
relation:
∆
(
al˜h
)
≥ ∆
(
al˜h+1
)
≥ . . . ≥ ∆
(
al˜ |A|
)
. (66)
Furthermore, we have Πprovider
(
al˜i
)
≤ ∆
(
al˜i
)
for all arcs l˜i . This is because Πprovider
(
al˜i
)
denotes
the provider’s optimal payoff with constraint pi j ≤ 1 (for all (i, j) ∈ A), and the expression of
∆
(
al˜i
)
equals the provider’s optimal payoff when there is no constraint pi j ≤ 1. In particular, when
µ∗i j = 0 for all (i, j) ∈ A, the equality holds, i.e., Πprovider
(
al˜i
)
= ∆
(
al˜i
)
.
When h < |A|, if the provider collaborates with the advertiser corresponding to arc l˜h , we have
µ∗i j = 0 for all (i, j) ∈ A (based on the definition of h). This means that Πprovider
(
al˜h
)
= ∆
(
al˜h
)
.
Considering (66), we have the following relation:
Πprovider
(
al˜h
)
≥ ∆
(
al˜h+1
)
≥ . . . ≥ ∆
(
al˜ |A|
)
. (67)
Because Πprovider
(
al˜i
)
≤ ∆
(
al˜i
)
for all arcs l˜i , we can further derive the following result:
Πprovider
(
al˜h
)
≥ Πprovider
(
al˜i
)
,∀i > h. (68)
This means that the provider’s payoff when it collaborates with the advertiser corresponding to
the h-th arc is no less than its payoff when it collaborates with the advertiser corresponding to the
i-th arc (i > h). As a result, the provider only needs to compare the first h arcs to determine the
optimal arc, as described in Step 3 in Section 6.1.2.
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Fig. 7. Illustration of Clustering.
O PROOF OF THEOREM 6.4
Proof. When the provider collaborates with advertiser k , it only has positive ad revenues on the
arcs pointing to k . Based on this and the condition that θi j = θ ji for all (i, j) ∈ A, we can compute
the provider’s payoff under the collaboration choice k in (69).
Note that we use (i, j) ∈ A : j = k to denote an arc (i, j) that belongs to set A and satisfies
j = k . Similarly, we use n ∈ N : n , k, (n,k) < A to denote a location n that belongs to
set N , is not k , and has no arc pointing to k . When deriving equality (a), we use the relation
that
∑
(i, j)∈A
( 1
8θi j (1 − c)
∑
n∈N
(
R jn − Rin
)
vn
)
= 0. We have proved this in Section L. The basic
idea is that when θi j = θ ji for all (i, j) ∈ A, the sum of 18θi j (1 − c)
∑
n∈N
(
R jn − Rin
)
vn and
1
8θ ji (1 − c)
∑
n∈N
(
Rin − R jn
)
vn is zero. Moreover, if (i, j) ∈ A, then (j, i) ∈ A. When deriving
equality (b), we use the expressions of differentvn . When θi j = θ ji for all (i, j) ∈ A and the provider
only collaborates with the location-based advertiser k , we have vk = −∑n∈N:n,k,(n,k )∈A θnkdnk ,
vn = θnkdnk for n ∈ N : n , k, (n,k) ∈ A, and vn = 0 for n ∈ N : n , k, (n,k) < A. When
deriving equality (c), we use the property that Rkt = Rtk and Rkk = 0.
In the result shown in (69), the term
∑
(i, j)∈A θi jξi j
( 1−c
2
)2 is independent of the choice of k . We
can multiply the rest part of the result by 4, and get the expression to be maximized in (24). □
P DIVISION OF INVESTIGATED AREA BASED ON RIDES’ ORIGINS AND
DESTINATIONS
In this section, we explain the division of the area based on the distribution of rides’ origins and
destinations. We use k-means clustering to cluster all the origin dots and destination dots into
15 clusters. We illustrate the clusters in Fig. 7, where different clusters have different colors. The
crosses indicate the cluster centroids. We use 15 locations to represent the 15 clusters, and let each
location’s coordinates be the coordinates of the corresponding cluster’s centroid.
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Πprovider
=
∑
(i, j)∈A
θi jξi j
( 1 + ai j − c
2
)2
−
∑
(i, j)∈A
(
1
8θi j
(
1 + ai j − c
) ∑
n∈N
(
Rjn − Rin
)
vn
)
=
∑
(i, j)∈A:j,k
θi jξi j
(
1 − c
2
)2
+
∑
(i, j)∈A:j=k
θi jξi j
( 1 + di j − c
2
)2
−
∑
(i, j)∈A:j,k
(
1
8θi j (1 − c)
∑
n∈N
(
Rjn − Rin
)
vn
)
−
∑
(i, j)∈A:j=k
(
1
8θi j
(
1 + di j − c
) ∑
n∈N
(
Rjn − Rin
)
vn
)
=
∑
(i, j)∈A
θi jξi j
(
1 − c
2
)2
+
∑
(i, j)∈A:j=k
θi jξi j
((
di j
2
)2
+ (1 − c) di j2
)
−
∑
(i, j)∈A
(
1
8θi j (1 − c)
∑
n∈N
(
Rjn − Rin
)
vn
)
−
∑
(i, j)∈A:j=k
(
1
8θi jdi j
∑
n∈N
(
Rjn − Rin
)
vn
)
(a)
=
∑
(i, j)∈A
θi jξi j
(
1 − c
2
)2
+
∑
(i, j)∈A:j=k
θi jξi j
((
di j
2
)2
+ (1 − c) di j2
)
−
∑
(i, j)∈A:j=k
(
1
8θi jdi j
∑
n∈N
(
Rjn − Rin
)
vn
)
=
∑
(i, j)∈A
θi jξi j
(
1 − c
2
)2
+
∑
(i, j)∈A:j=k
θi jξi j
((
di j
2
)2
+ (1 − c) di j2
)
−
∑
(i, j)∈A:j=k
©­«18θi jdi j ©­«
∑
n∈N:n,k,(n,k )<A
(
Rjn − Rin
)
vn +
∑
n∈N:n,k,(n,k )∈A
(
Rjn − Rin
)
vn +
(
Rjk − Rik
)
vk
ª®¬ª®¬
(b)
=
∑
(i, j)∈A
θi jξi j
(
1 − c
2
)2
+
∑
(i, j)∈A:j=k
θi jξi j
((
di j
2
)2
+ (1 − c) di j2
)
−
∑
(i, j)∈A:j=k
©­«18θi jdi j ©­«
∑
n∈N:n,k,(n,k)∈A
(
Rjn − Rin
)
θnkdnk +
(
Rjk − Rik
) ©­«
∑
n∈N:n,k,(n,k)∈A
−θnkdnk ª®¬ª®¬ª®¬
=
∑
(i, j)∈A
θi jξi j
(
1 − c
2
)2
+
1
4
∑
s :(s,k )∈A
θsk ξsk
(
d2sk + 2 (1 − c)dsk
)
−
∑
s :(s,k )∈A
©­«18θskdsk ©­«
∑
n∈N:n,k,(n,k)∈A
(Rkn − Rsn − Rkk + Rsk )θnkdnk ª®¬ª®¬
(c)
=
∑
(i, j)∈A
θi jξi j
(
1 − c
2
)2
+
1
4
∑
s :(s,k )∈A
θsk ξsk
(
d2sk + 2 (1 − c)dsk
)
−
∑
s :(s,k )∈A
©­«18θskdsk ©­«
∑
t :(t,k )∈A
(Rtk − Rst + Rsk )θtkdtk ª®¬ª®¬
=
∑
(i, j)∈A
θi jξi j
(
1 − c
2
)2
+
1
4
∑
s :(s,k )∈A
θsk ξsk
(
d2sk + 2 (1 − c)dsk
)
+
1
4
∑
s :(s,k)∈A
∑
t :(t,k )∈A
1
2θskdskθtkdtk (Rst − Rtk − Rsk ) . (69)
Proc. ACM Meas. Anal. Comput. Syst., Vol. 3, No. 1, Article 6. Publication date: January 2019.
